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The Corporate Purpose of Social License
Hillary A. Sale1
This Article deploys the sociological theory of social license, or the
acceptance of a business or organization by the relevant
communities and stakeholders, in the context of the board of
directors and corporate governance. Corporations are generally
treated as “private” actors and thus are regulated by “private”
corporate law. This construct allows for considerable latitude.
Corporate actors are not, however, solely “private.” They are the
beneficiaries of economic and political power, and the decisions they
make have impacts that extend well beyond the boundaries of the
entities they represent.
Using Wells Fargo and Uber as case studies, this Article explores how
the failure to account for the public nature of corporate actions,
regardless of whether a “legal” license exists, can result in the loss of
“social” license. This loss occurs through publicness, which is the
interplay between inside corporate governance players and outside
actors who report on, recapitulate, reframe and, in some cases,
control the company’s information and public perception. The theory
of social license is that businesses and other entities exist with
permission from the communities in which they are located, as well
as permission from the greater community and outside stakeholders.
In this sense, businesses are social, not just economic, institutions
and, thus, they are subject to public accountability and, at times,
public control. Social license derives not from legally granted
permission, but instead from the development of legitimacy,
credibility, and trust within the relevant communities and
stakeholders. It can prevent demonstrations, boycotts, shutdowns,
negative publicity, and the increases in regulation that are a
hallmark of publicness — but social license must be earned with
consistent trustworthy behavior. Thus, social license is bilateral, not
unilateral, and should be part of corporate strategy and a tool for
risk management and managing publicness more generally.
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By focusing on and deploying social license and publicness in the
context of board decision-making, this Article adds to the discussions
in the literature from other disciplines, such as the economic theory
on reputational capital, and provides boards with a set of standards
with which to engage and address the publicness of the companies
they represent. Discussing, weighing, and developing social license is
not just in the zone of what boards can do, but is something they
should do, making it a part of strategic, proactive cost-benefit
decision-making. Indeed, the failure to do so can have dramatic
business consequences.
Introduction.
On January 14, 2020, Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock investment
management company, one of the largest institutional shareholders,
released a letter addressed to the CEOs of public companies.2 In that
letter, Fink pointed out that society and shareholders alike are
making increasing demands of companies, asking them to respond to
broad societal changes:3
As I have written in past letters, a company cannot
achieve long-term profits without embracing purpose
and considering the needs of a broad range of
stakeholders. A pharmaceutical company that hikes
prices ruthlessly, a mining company that
shortchanges safety, a bank that fails to respect its
clients — these companies may maximize returns in
the short term. But, as we have seen again and again,
these actions that damage society will catch up with a
company and destroy shareholder value. By contrast,
a strong sense of purpose and a commitment to
stakeholders helps a company connect more deeply
to its customers and adjust to the changing demands
of society.4
Fink pressed CEOs to lead on various issues and focus not only on
shareholders, but also to consider the impact of their companies on
all of their stakeholders. Fink issued similar letters highlighting these
themes in January of 2018 and 2019.5 He argued that boards should,
Larry Fink, Annual Letter to CEOs: A Fundamental Reshaping of
Finance, BLACKROCK (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-finkceo-letter.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Larry Fink, Annual Letter to CEOs: Purpose and Profit, BLACKROCK
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/enus/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter; Larry Fink, Annual
2

2

as a matter of company strategy, explore their impact on and
interaction with all stakeholders, including “shareholders,
employees, customers, and the communities in which they operate.”6
Further, Fink argued that corporate governance modes must be
developed that allow boards, and not just CEOs, to better direct and
oversee the long-term strategies of their companies.7 To this end,
Fink instructed boards to ask the following questions about their
companies:
What role do we play in the community? How are we
managing our impact on the environment? Are we
working to create a diverse workforce? Are we
adapting to technological change? Are we providing
the retraining and opportunities that our employees
and our business will need to adjust to an
increasingly automated world? Are we using
behavioral finance and other tools to prepare
workers for retirement so that they invest in a way
that will help them achieve their goals?8
These exhortations represent a stark shift from traditional
shareholder primacy rhetoric.9 Fink is not alone.10 He and others are
demanding that boards alter their corporate governance strategy to
effectively anticipate and address a wide variety of stakeholder
concerns — arguing that those who do not will lose their license to
operate — a term that arises out of the sociological literature.

Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, BLACKROCK (Jan. 12, 2018),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/investorrelations/larry-fink-ceo-letter.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Shareholder primacy is the idea that shareholder value is the exclusive
objective of corporations. See e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Director v.
Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW 45, 1-2
(2002).
10 See, e.g., Press Release, Business Roundtable, Statement on the Purpose of
a Corporation (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-thepurpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-allamericans (announcing new commitments to all stakeholders, including a
commitment “to protect the environment by embracing sustainable
practices across our businesses”); see also Martin Lipton, Steven A.
Rosenblum & Karessa L. Cain, Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2020,
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Dec. 10, 2019),
https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/(arguing
boards will need to focus on the corporation’s “economic and societal
ecosystem in order to build a sustainable and long-term value
proposition”).
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How are boards to implement these significant changes to their
traditional governance and business concerns? And, how might such
a change improve long-term corporate value? This Article suggests
that boards can adapt and deploy social license theory as an effective
tool to implement stakeholder-based corporate governance
practices that benefit shareholders and stakeholders alike. In
combination with publicness, social license theory provides boards
with an approach to understanding their three key roles (strategy,
risk, and people) and to undertaking those roles with attention to the
company’s relationship with society and the outside pressures that
can derail even the most well-developed strategies and goals.
This Article explores the construct of social license, the acceptance of
a business or organization by the relevant communities and
stakeholders, in the context of the board of directors and corporate
governance. Corporations are generally regulated and treated as
“private” actors, and corporate law falls into the zone of “private”
law.11 The board is at the fulcrum of the corporate entity. It is
charged with managing governance and overseeing management,
and the “private” status of corporate entities provides considerable
latitude for director decision-making. Yet, time and again, companies
fail to account for the public nature of their actions, including those
for which they otherwise have legal permission or legal license.12
Social license theory, prominent in sociological studies of community
and business relations, provides a powerful construct for both
scholars examining corporate actions and boards developing
business strategies and weighing risk. It adds to the discussions from
other disciplines, such as the economic theory on reputational
capital, and provides boards with a set of standards to help address
the publicness of the companies they represent, making it part of
proactive cost-benefit decision-making.
Social license and publicness, a theory about which I and other
corporate scholars have previously written, are connected.13
See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2014).
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 913 (2005) (arguing one
reason for these continued failures is that "the evolution of governance
arrangements – which are in part designed to constrain and regulate
management – has been for too long left to a process controlled by
management”).
13 See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market
Intermediation, Publicness, and Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH.
U.L. REV. 487 (2015); Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of
Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1629 (2014); Hillary A. Sale,
Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012 (2013); Hillary A.
Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137
(2011); Robert B. Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing
the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (2013); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B.
11
12
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Publicness is the interplay between inside corporate governance
players and the outside actors who report on, recapitulate, reframe,
and, in some cases, control the company’s information and public
perception.14 Corporate decision makers are the beneficiaries of
considerable economic and political power and, consequently, the
decisions they make have impacts that extend well beyond the
boundaries of the entities they represent. These outside
constituencies include the media and the general public. Although
the freedom corporate actors enjoy is subject to laws and
regulations, publicness, too, creates limits on the powers of those
actors — but not necessarily through court decisions, legislation, or
regulation. In this manner, publicness concerns the space above the
legally licensed line.
Social license also occupies this space. The theory of social license is
that businesses and other entities exist with permission from the
communities in which they are located, as well as permission from
the greater community and outside stakeholders. In this sense,
businesses are social, not just economic, institutions and, thus, they
are subject to public accountability and, at times, public control.15
Even if not explicit, businesses require both legal license and social
license to operate. Social license derives not from legally granted
permission, but instead from the development of legitimacy,
credibility, and trust within the relevant communities and
stakeholders. It can prevent demonstrations, boycotts, shutdowns,
negative publicity, and the increases in regulation that are a

Thompson, ‘‘Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After
the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337 (2013); Joan MacLeod Hemingway,
Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities
Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477 (2014); Joan M. Heminway &
Shelden R. Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the
Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879 (2011); Jill E. Fisch, The
Mess at Morgan: Risk, Incentives and Shareholder Empowerment, 83
U. CIN. L. REV. 651 (2015); Cary M. Shelby, Are Hedge Funds Still
Private? Exploring Publicness in the Face of Incoherency, 69 SMU L.
REV. 405 (2016).
14 See Sale, J.P. Morgan, supra note 13 at 1630 (“[O]utside parties do
more than listen; they reframe and often critique the stories, in
ways that may force corporations to alter their preferred
governance structure--regardless of their legal status as private or
public.”); see also Sale, Public Governance, supra note 13 at 101314; Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, supra note 13 at 141.
15 Domènec Melé & Jaume Armengou, Moral Legitimacy in
Controversial Projects and Its Relationship with Social License to
Operate: A Case Study, 136 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 729 (2016). See also
Jeffrey Bone, Legal Perspective on Corporate Responsibility:
Contractarian or Communitarian Thought, 24 CAN. J. L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 277, 288 (2011) (noting that corporations possess a
social contract with their constituents and societal stakeholders).
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hallmark of publicness.16 As a result, the company’s social license can
be a tool for risk management in particular and for managing
publicness more generally.17 Importantly, unlike legal licenses,
which can be applied and paid for, social license, or the license to
operate, must be earned with consistent, trustworthy behavior,
along with solutions and compromises achieved through dialogue
with relevant sectors of the community.18 In this sense, social license
is bilateral, not unilateral, connecting to the process and substance of
publicness and differing considerably from legal license.
This Article analyzes publicness and social license together,
developing the theory of social license in the context of, and as a tool
for, engaged director decision-making. Both publicness and social
license are implicated when the pressure for changes in the decisionmaking structure and the allocation of power within a corporation
comes from “outsiders.” When outsiders make themselves part of the
governance dialogue, publicness is at work. In some cases, decisionmaking transfers from officers and directors, with some input from
shareholders, to stakeholders and outsiders.19 Much of this shift
Phillipe Hanna, Frank Vanclay, Esther J. Langdon, & Jos Arts,
Conceptualizing Social Protest and the Significance of Protest Action
to Large Projects, 3 EXTRACTIVE INDUST. & SOC. 217, 217-19 (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2015.10.006. Front end
regulation, of course, has its costs. It can dampen the
entrepreneurial spirit. Social license, in contrast, is not formal
regulation. It is self-regulation, and long-run focused.
17 Robert G. Boutilier, Leeora Black, & Ian Thomson, From Metaphor
to Management Tool: How the Social License to Operate Can Stabilise
the Socio-political Environment for Business, INT’L MINE MGMT. 2012
PROCEEDINGS, 227-237 (2012). See also Margaret M. Blair, Cynthia A.
Williams, & Li-Wen Lin, The New Role for Assurance Services in
Global Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 344 (2008) (detailing how
corporations increasingly turn to third-party assurance networks
as a tool for managing social, environmental, and governance
risks). However, proponents of social license view it as more than
simple risk management. It is just as much about joint
understanding. See Robert G. Boutilier & Ian Thomson, Modelling
and Measuring the Social License to Operate: Fruits of a Dialogue
Between Theory and Practice, SOCIALICENSE.COM (2011),
https://socialicense.com/publications/Modelling%20and%20Measuri
ng%20the%20SLO.pdf; Geert Demuijnck & Bjorn Fasterling, The
Social License to Operate, 136 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 680, 680-81 (2016).
18 Demuijnck & Fasterling, supra note 17 at 675. See also Dirk
Matten et. al., Behind the Mask: Revealing the True Face of Corporate
Citizenship, 45 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 109, 110 (2003).
19 For perspectives on the relationship between corporations,
stakeholders, and communities, see Merrick Dodd, For Whom are
Corporate Managers Trustees? 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932);
William Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 266-67 (1992); Margaret Blair & Lynn Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247
(1999); Bone, supra note 15; Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the
16
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occurs through the publicness process explored below and, as this
Article argues, can be managed with an effective social license.
Interestingly, in this sense, social license occupies space that
corporate law and fiduciary duties purport to control.20
Today, publicness grows through a public-private dialectic that
derives, at least in part, from the ease and availability of media.
Scrutiny is 24 hours a day 7 days a week, and the failure of corporate
actors to understand this dynamic results in costly challenges and
failures. Further, when situations erupt, the existing level of
corporate publicness can multiply due to feedback loops created by
outsiders and the media. The financial crisis, about which I and many
others have written, reveals this aspect of publicness.21 Consider, for
example, how the reactions of citizens to the financial crisis
produced demands for accountability and resulted in increased
government intervention and regulation, most notably the DoddFrank Act.22
Publicness in corporate governance develops as companies make
choices, including those about risks and risk taking.23 The company’s
risk choices, and its management of them, impacts not just the
traditional governance participants — shareholders, officers, and
directors — but also community stakeholders and the public.24 Risk
failures can be costly — and not just for the company. In the wake
of risks gone bad, employees lose their jobs, local stakeholders
suffer, and community members even lose their lives.25 The result
Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 129, 131 (2009); Bryan
Horrigan, Fault Lines in the Intersection Between Corporate
Governance and Social Responsibility, 25 U.N.S.W.L.J. 515 (2002);
MICHAEL DIAMOND & LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATIONS, A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH: CASES AND MATERIALS FOR A COURSE IN
CORPORATE LAW, 652-55 (2004) (describing “other constituency”
statues that allow boards of directors to take the interests of
named constituencies, such as labor or local communities, into
account when making corporate decisions).
20 A successful social license engenders both internal and external
corporate trust, for example. Trust is an essential component of
corporate law that is, arguably, not effectively managed by current
corporate fiduciary doctrine. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and
Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L. J. 425 (1993).
21 See Sale, Public Governance, supra note 13 at 1013-14; Sale, The
New “Public” Corporation, supra note 13 at 141; John C. Coffee, Jr., &
Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have A Better
Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707 (2009).
22 See Sale, Public Governance, supra note 13 at 1027 (arguing that the
Dodd-Frank Act was “borne out of the corporate failure to self-govern”
and “the public's desire for a quid pro quo or retribution”).
23 See, e.g., Sale, J.P. Morgan, supra note 13.
24 See, e.g., Horrigan, supra note 19.
25 Sabrina Tavernise, Report Faults Mine Owner for Explosion that
Killed 29, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2011),
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for corporations is increased scrutiny and pressure, as well as, when
outcomes are particularly bad, new laws and regulations.26 Examples
abound. Consider BP’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico or the financial
crisis of 2008-2009. Social license was lost in these situations, and,
as this Article argues, had the decision makers been more focused on
social license and its importance for the growth and sustainability of
their businesses, they may well have made different risk choices and
prevented or diminished the outcomes of publicness.
Part I of this Article examines the concept of publicness in greater
detail, developing its substantive and procedural aspects. Part II then
illustrates the role publicness played in the corporate scandals of
Wells Fargo and Uber. Part III focuses on the various stages of social
license theory, drawing on examples from companies that actively
engaged in creating and maintaining social license as a tool to ensure
sustainable business growth. Finally, Part IV applies social license
theory to the Wells Fargo and Uber scandals to analyze how the
companies failed to earn social licenses, assess the impact of that
failure on their respective scandals, and explore how they could have
created and maintained social licenses. The result is a more robust
understanding of corporate governance and the board’s role,
informed by the sociological literatures and an analysis of social
license.
I.

Publicness and Corporate Governance.

This Part of the Article explicates the substantive and procedural
aspects of the theory of publicness.27 Substantively, publicness
concerns the permissive nature of firms. Companies devolve from
the public. Their “private” status is the result of legislative grants and
is thus permissive.28 Therefore, corporations are creatures of the
state, and it is this government-granted power that gives them legal
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/us/20mine.html?mcubz=0
.
26 CFPB Proposes Prohibiting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses that
Deny Groups of Consumers their Day in Court, CFPB NEWSROOM (May
5, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/aboutus/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-proposesprohibiting-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-deny-groupsconsumers-their-day-court/.
27 Of course, substance and procedure, as distinctions in the law,
are easily collapsed. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this article, I
use the distinction to help delineate the types of publicness boards
face.
28 James D. Cox, Corporate Law and the Limits of Private Ordering,
93 WASH. U.L. REV. 8 (2015); Bone, supra note 15 at 279-84. See also
Jean L. Cohen & Andrew Arato, CIV. SOC’Y & POL. THEORY 352 (1992)
(“[T]he private . . . ‘spheres’ have always been constituted and
regulated by law, even if what is constituted includes a domain of
autonomous judgment that can come into conflict with law.”).
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legitimacy, limited liability, and the opportunity to expand and
grow.29 Indeed, historically, corporate entities were granted status
on a case-by-case basis.30 Early entities with this status were often
quasi-public in nature, like public transit and other authorities today.
Moreover, the potential and actual impact of corporate entities has
long been a subject of discussion and concern, with, for example, the
role of banks with respect to the money supply and their impact on
the economy receiving particular scrutiny.31
Thus, even though entities are allowed to incorporate and operate
with considerable degrees of freedom, that freedom is permissive
and easily circumscribed.32 Why? Because corporate entities wield
economic and political power.33 Their decisions and choices impact
employees, communities, and the environment, and, in the case of
the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the economy and citizens much more
broadly. This is the zone of social license — the zone that BlackRock
wants boards to give more space in their governance decisions.
Demands for accountability are the natural and instinctive responses
to the accumulation of power, and the simplest forms of
accountability come through regulation and constraints on private
ordering.34 Thus, the public, through the legislature and other
Indeed, publicness, as “derived from political authority, affects
virtually every organization.” BARRY BOZEMAN, ALL ORGANIZATIONS
ARE PUBLIC: BRIDGING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES 13
(1987).
30 Robert B. Thompson, Why New Corporate Law Arises: Delaware’s
Golden Age and Likely Changes in the 21st Century, in THE CORPORATE
CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (Steven D.
Solomon & Randall Thomas eds., Univ. of Chi. Press, 2019); Hillary
A. Sale, Delaware’s Diminishment?, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN
CHANGING TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (Steven D. Solomon &
Randall Thomas eds., Univ. of Chi. Press, 2019); Bone, supra note 15
at 279-84. See generally Samuel Williston, History of the Law of
Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1888).
31 Thompson, supra note 30.
32 Indeed, the “private” status of corporations is in fact a construct. Cf.
MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND
AMERICAN LAW 277 (1990) (exploring similar issues in the context of
family law and stating that “[t]racing the presence of state power in
the family sphere, historically described as removed from the state,
suggests something powerful about boundaries: both sides of a
boundary are regulated, even if the line was supposed to
distinguish the regulated from the unregulated”).
33 DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK 18 (2016). See
also Ian B. Lee, Citizenship and the Corporation, 34 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 129, 131 (2009); ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE PROPERTY, pt. IV (1932) (developing
arguments related to the power of corporations and the economy).
34 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U.L. REV.
(2003); Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation
Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104
29
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officials, constrains corporate choices ex ante through laws and
regulations — a form of substantive publicness.
Substantive publicness also exists through ex post enforcement. This
enforcement, via investigations and litigation, occurs when
companies violate public norms.35 Recent examples include the
Dodd-Frank Act and the multiple investigations and enforcement
actions against banks in the wake of the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
Prior to that, waves of enforcement grew out of the Enron and
Worldcom scandals, the options backdating scandal, and the dot-com
crash.36 More recently, Wells Fargo and Uber have also experienced
their share of substantive publicness.
Interestingly, ex post enforcement is both public and private. Class
actions are a key example of private litigation that supplements the
public enforcement system. Resources at the federal and state levels
are constrained. Thus, in the context of securities litigation (and,
arguably, state fiduciary duty claims), courts have regularly asserted

COLUM. L. REV. (2004); Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government
Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 430 (2003). See also Sale, Public
Governance, supra note 13 at 1013-14; Sale, The New “Public”
Corporation, supra note 13 at 141; Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A.
Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections Upon
Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 904 (2003) (noting that
government governance grows in response to scandals, and
incrementally over time).
35 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power:
Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619
(2001); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware
Corporate Law Work? 44 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1009 (1997). See generally
John C. Coffee Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the U.S. and
Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 198 (2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=694581 (working paper); John C. Coffee,
The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be
Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019;
Sale, Public Governance, supra note 13 at 1013-14 ; Sale, The New
“Public” Corporation, supra note 13 at 141; Thompson & Sale, supra
note 34.
36 See Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance:
Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 961, 965 (2003) (“The SEC took several actions in the
wake of the Enron scandal and related reports of corporate
misdeeds. The WorldCom fiasco helped propel Congress toward
legislation and within a month, the President had signed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.”); see also Langevoort & Thompson,
“Publicness” supra note 13 at 374 (stating that “nearly all the
examples of the melding of investor and broader social interests
that have changed the meaning of publicness are reactions to
highly salient (usually scandalous) events involving large public
companies”).
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that private litigation is important to preserving market integrity
and supplementing the government’s enforcement reach.37
Publicness is also a process and that process, in turn, results in
changes to substantive publicness. Our understanding of the
substantive aspect of publicness, which highlights the publicly
permissive nature of private ordering, develops over time. Why?
Because the forces that drive it metamorphose, impacting the
process of publicness itself. Media, for example, is currently an
important component of the process of publicness. Media coverage
allows members of the public to participate in a dialogue about
corporate actions and choices. 38 That dialogue, in turn, plays a role
in how the government makes enforcement and regulatory
decisions. Directors who fail to understand the power of the 24/7
news cycle and the growth of social media are neglecting their role.
For example, government has increased its role in developing and
supporting substantive publicness in response to media coverage
and public pressure, and in the face of crises.39 Regulatory surges are
an inevitable response to widespread crises,40 but as the Wells Fargo
and Uber case studies reveal, even an individualized scandal can
invoke the publicness process. The process, in turn, is accelerated by
news media and social media.
When entities fail to either acknowledge their publicness or manage
with an understanding of it, the omission can result in a process
through which private ordering is diminished.41 Ignoring the social
license can lead to the elimination of private privileges and their
replacement with laws, regulations, and substantive publicness. For
example, as media coverage and public outrage developed in
response to the financial crisis of 2008-2009, the process of
publicness created pressure that resulted in federal regulation for
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v.
Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &
Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,
Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014). See also Sale & Thompson, supra note 13;
Hillary A. Sale & Donald C. Langevoort, “We Believe”: Omnicare, Legal
Risk Disclosure, and Corporate Governance, 66 DUKE L. J. 763 (2016).
38 Consider WeWork and Away. Alyssa Newcomb, The Year in Scandal:
Business Leaders who hit the Headlines, NBC NEWS (Dec. 30, 2019)
https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/year-scandalbusiness-leaders-who-hit-headlines-n1108596 (discussing Adam
Neumann’s exit from WeWork and Away’s reorganization challenges).
39 Langevoort & Thompson, “Publicness”, supra note 13; Sale, The
New “Public” Corporation, supra note 13; Sale, Public Governance,
supra note 13; Sale, J.P. Morgan, supra note 13.
40 See, e.g., Coffee, The Political Economy, supra note 35.
41 Cf. Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 833, 846-50 (discussing, in the context of family-law, how
legal doctrine shapes childhood both through substance and
omissions).
37
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boards of directors. Then, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act42
(and before it the Sarbanes-Oxley Act43) regulating director
qualifications for the board and some committees.44 In addition,
federal regulation requires boards to have particular committees
(audit, compensation, and nomination and governance) and sets
forth requirements for “independent” members of these
committees.45 Prior to that government regulation, board
committees and their membership were subject to private
ordering.46 These examples underscore how the process of
publicness results in the substance of publicness.
II. The Publicness of Wells Fargo and Uber.
Consider two companies: Wells Fargo, a publicly held bank
perceived to be a leader in the financial services industry, and Uber,
a once privately held start-up. Both companies reeled from scandals,
as well as the resulting media attention and publicness process.
Through their respective responses to these scandals, the companies
demonstrated the power and cost of publicness and thus are
excellent case studies for examining the role that social license can
play in the boardroom and in managing the process and substance of
publicness.
A. Wells Fargo.
In the years following 2016, Wells Fargo, a financial services
company providing banking, insurance, investments, mortgage, and
consumer and commercial financial services,47 had to react to a
series of revelations about its sales and other practices and contend
with publicness. Its fact pattern provides an opportunity to analyze
how the process of publicness, and the attendant substantive
outcomes, impacted the company, as well as where board attention
to social license could have made a difference. Ultimately, Wells
Fargo paid a steep price. Out-of-pocket costs for the company
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
43 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5) (2012).
44 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5); 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). See also Guhan
Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113
YALE L.J. 621, 682 (2003) (predicting that, in addition to the federal
government, Delaware courts may also continue “mov[ing] in a
pro-shareholder, antimanagerial direction in order to avoid further
federal preemption on (historically) state corporate law issues”).
45 17 CFR 229.407.
46 Sale, J.P. Morgan, supra note 13.
47 Wells Fargo Today, WELLS FARGO (2017),
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/corporate/w
ells-fargo-today.pdf.
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reached $3 billion as of December 2018, 48 and its CEO, John Stumpf,
was ousted and lost millions when the company clawed back his
pay.49. In 2020, Stumpf was also fined $17.5 million in settlements
with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and agreed to a
lifetime ban from the banking industry.50 He, along with many of his
colleagues, failed to appreciate the power of publicness and its
potential impact on the company and its license to operate. Wells
Fargo’s actions remain subject to scrutiny, resulting in governmentimposed governance changes.
According to Forbes, in 2019 Wells Fargo was the 10th largest public
company in the world based on assets, profits, sales, and revenue.51
At the end of the third quarter of 2019, Wells Fargo was ranked sixth
among U.S. banks based on assets ($1.9 trillion),52 a decline from its
standing in previous years. It was ranked fourth among U.S. banks
based on assets at the end of 2018 ($1.9 trillion)53 and third based
on assets in 2017 ($2.0 trillion).54 In short, the scandals damaged the
company’s reputation and earnings model and Wells Fargo “isn't
sure it will ever recover from the slowdown.”55 Why? Because the
numbers it hit in the past were achieved through high pressure sales
targets paired with incentives. Those targets and incentives have
been eliminated, but past quarterly and annual results that were
inflated by the frauds still exist as targets.
So, what was at the heart of the Wells Fargo scandal? Lack of
attention to the company’s social license and the process of
publicness. This lack of attention manifested as unacceptable
consumer practices, toxic incentives, and grievous risk management.
See, infra note 116 and accompanying text.
Tyler Durden, Wells Fargo Claws Back Additional $72 Million
From John Stumpf, Former Retail Banking Head, ZERO HEDGE (Apr.
10, 2017), http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-04-10/wellsfargo-claws-back-additional-72-million-john-stumpf-former-retailbanking-head.
50 Stacy Cowley & Emily Flitter, Wells Fargo’s Ex-Chief Fined $17.5 Million
Over Fake Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/business/wells-fargo-ceofine.html.
51 Andrea Murphy, Jonathan Ponciano, Sarah Hansen, & Halah Touryalai,
Global 2000: The World’s Largest Public Companies, FORBES (May 15, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/global2000/#30fdd46b335d.
52 Wells Fargo Today, WELLS FARGO (2019),
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/corporate/w
ells-fargo-today.pdf.
53 Wells Fargo Today, WELLS FARGO (2018),
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/corporate/wellsfargo-today.pdf.
54 Wells Fargo (2017), supra note 47.
55 Lucinda Shen, Wells Fargo Says Sales Scandal Could Hurt Growth
Permanently, FORTUNE (Apr. 13, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/04/13/wells-fargo-report-earnings/.
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The bank had long operated in a decentralized manner, with three
key operating segments: Community Banking, Wholesale Banking,
and Wealth Management.56 The roots of the scandal are in the
Community Bank segment, where employees perpetuated a crossselling scheme. Employees engaged in a series of fraudulent
transactions, including opening unauthorized customer bank, credit
card, auto insurance, and other accounts in order to meet their sales
goals. Customers did not know about these accounts when they were
created, and many did not realize the accounts existed — even after
they were charged fees. Employees — at least 5,000 of them — were
pressured and incentivized to create these accounts. In some cases,
the pressure was “extreme.”57 Employees reported receiving
multiple calls per day from supervisors, demanding updates on sales
goals.58 They were encouraged to sell unnecessary products.59 The
bank ranked employees against each other, with compensation and
promotion tied to the rankings.60 Sales rankings were circulated
regularly and eliminated only after regional leaders pushed back,
citing a culture of shaming and perpetual sales pressure.61 Further,
employees who could not meet the goals feared termination or
“career-hindering criticism.”62
Why did cross-selling occur? Because that is how banks make
money. In general, a single account at a bank brings little profit;
however, some products, like mortgages, are quite lucrative.63 The
more accounts or products a customer has, the more likely that
customer is to stay with the bank and to engage in higher dollar
transactions.64 A simple set of calculations based on the number of
customers and the increased number of products per customer
during the high-pressure cross-selling period at Wells Fargo reveals
Wells Fargo (2017), supra note 47.
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS OF THE BOARD OF WELLS FARGO & COMPANY,
SALES PRACTICES INVESTIGATION REPORT 7 (2017), WELLS FARGO,
https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/investorrelations/presentations/2017/board-report.pdf.
58 Id. at 7.
59 Id. at 7.
60 Id. at 20.
61 Id. at 20.
62 Id. 7.
63 See, e.g., Adam Davidson, How Regulation Failed with Wells Fargo,
NEW YORKER (Sep. 12, 2016)
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/the-record-fineagainst-wells-fargo-points-to-the-failure-of-regulation; Halah
Touryalai, Despite Wells Fargo's Fake Accounts Fiasco, Cross-Selling
Remains Key Strategy, FORBES (Sep. 13, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2016/09/13/despitewells-fargos-fake-accounts-fiasco-cross-selling-remains-keystrategy/#368767ab7cc5.
64 Touryalai, supra note 63. “The idea is that having a greater share of a
customer's wallet means it will be tougher for him to leave the bank.”
Id.
56
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the bank likely made billions through cross-sells.65 Although not all
cross-sells were the result of fraud, the power of the cross-sell is
nevertheless evident.66 In fact, “sales integrity-related allegations
and associated terminations and resignations increased relatively
steadily from the second quarter of 2007,” peaking in the fourth
quarter of 2013. 67
The Wells Fargo situation is typical of other sales-related frauds. As
sales grow, the pressure to sustain and increase sales also grows.
Indeed, the sales model in the Community Bank segment was
volume-focused and “relied heavily on year-over-year sales
growth.”68 The result was more pressure on the sales force leading to
sales-integrity issues.69 From sandbagging (withholding sales in a
particular quarter to push them into the next) to accounts with de
minimis funding, the evidence of problems grew.70 When an
investigative newspaper report exposed the issues, the company’s
board finally focused on the problem and the pressure “moderated
somewhat.”71 Integrity problems, among other issues, also
decreased.72
Nevertheless, the problems had persisted for a long time. As early as
2002, the Community Bank saw growth in sales practice violations.73
An internal report from 2004 reveals both an increase in violations
and an increase in terminations.74 But, there was little willingness to
address the problems. According to the 2017 independent
investigation report, prepared at the behest of the Wells Fargo board
of directors (the “2017 Independent Report”), the Community Bank’s
efforts to address the concerns were “incremental, implemented
slowly and insufficient to address the root causes of the problem.”75
Leadership was “disinclin[ed]” to see the systemic nature of the
fraud.76 Instead, the culture was one of blame for employees and lack

Davidson, supra note 63. “Wells Fargo has surely made tens of
billions of dollars, and likely hundreds of billions, by employing its
aggressive cross-selling approach.” Id.
66 Id.
67 Wells Fargo (2017), supra note 47.
68 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, supra note 57 at 19.
69 Chris Arnold, Former Wells Fargo Employees Describe Toxic Sales
Culture, Even At HQ, NPR (Oct. 4, 2016),
http://www.npr.org/2016/10/04/496508361/former-wellsfargo-employees-describe-toxic-sales-culture-even-at-hq.
70 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, supra note 57 at 21.
71 Id. at 6.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 31.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 41.
76 Id. at 6.
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of analysis as to the causes, even though employees had called the
company’s hotline and reported problems.77
The account-creation process went on for many years, ending only
when the situation imploded publicly. Indeed, before the fraud hit
the presses, an analyst from Rafferty Capital, who had personal
experience banking with Wells Fargo, stated that he did not believe
the story Wells Fargo told: that doughnuts, seating, and service
accounted for its continued growth and success. Instead, in his
opinion, employee management and incentives had to be the
reason.78 He was half right. That does not, however, actually answer
the “how” question. How did these practices happen, on a large scale,
without anyone higher up knowing or noticing? The answer is:
people did know. Nevertheless, Wells Fargo’s culture and
organizational structure prevented the information from flowing
upwards and that, in turn, contributed to the board’s failure to do its
job — monitoring the company’s public nature and preventing the
process of publicness.
Interestingly, Wells Fargo exited the financial crisis of 2008-2009
with a relatively clean and positive reputation. Its CEO, John Stumpf,
was praised for his management style and the way in which Wells
Fargo weathered the crisis. One magazine article described Wells
Fargo as the “big winner in the financial crisis” and analyzed how
Stumpf, and the Wells Fargo business model, resulted in the bank
growing and thriving at a time when the rest of the banking industry
was still recovering.79 Ironically, when the article appeared in The
Economist, the practices that caused the recent scandal were
gathering steam within the company.80
The decentralized nature of Wells Fargo contributed to the scandal.
Deference to business unit leaders was a hallmark of the company.
The Community Bank leader was Carrie Tolstedt, a proponent of
decentralized management, who was widely perceived to be both
very successful and close to Stumpf.81 She was also criticized as
insular, defensive, and “notoriously resistant to outside intervention
and oversight.”82 In combination with decentralization, her approach
Matt Egan, I Called the Wells Fargo Ethics Line and Was Fired,
CNN (Sept. 21, 2016),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/21/investing/wells-fargo-firedworkers-retaliation-fake-accounts/index.html.
78 Riding High: The Big Winner from the Financial Crisis, THE ECONOMIST
(Sept. 14, 2013), https://www.economist.com/news/finance-andeconomics/21586295-big-winner-financial-crisis-riding-high.
79 Id.
80 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, supra note 57 at 31. The report reveals that
in 2004 there was both an increase in violations and an increase in
terminations triggered by those violations. Id.
81 Id. at 99.
82 Id. at 13.
77
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contributed to the lack of visibility into the cross-selling issues and
the inevitable demands for accountability. As decentralization
increased, decisions and messages were carried out in different
ways.83
Consider the decentralization of the risk function. At Wells Fargo,
lines of business had their own risk managers who answered to the
heads of their business, rather than to a central risk-management
person.84 Further, it was not until after the 2008-2009 financial
crisis, in 2011, that the board created a Risk Committee to oversee
risk across all the units at Wells Fargo.85 The Risk Committee
decided that the right approach was to grow the central risk
function, endow it with both the responsibility and the ability to
oversee risk across all business lines, and provide it with increased
funding.86 Nevertheless, this process did not begin until 2013 and
took multiple years to implement.87
Other functions at Wells Fargo were also decentralized. For example,
the Community Bank had its own human resources department.88
Consequently, the problems with employee terminations, turnover,
and other issues in the Community Bank were seen in isolation and
not compared to those of other divisions.89 In short, fragmentation
compounded the issues, diminishing transparency and visibility.
Moreover, the perception at Wells Fargo was that these issues were
of “modest significance.”90 The internal understanding of “customer
harm” was limited to fees and penalties (the zone of legal license), as
opposed to brand, reputation, or customer trust.91 Yet, brand,
reputation, and customer trust are precisely in the space of
publicness and, as explored in Part III, in the zone of social license.
They are also issues within the domain of the board and its fiduciary
duties — despite the fact that the Wells Fargo board did not think so
at the time.

See, Matt Kelly, Third-Party Risks in Decentralized Organizations,
RADICAL COMPLIANCE (August 4, 2016),
http://www.radicalcompliance.com/2016/08/04/third-partyrisks-in-decentralized-organizations/.
84 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, supra note 57 at 11.
85 Id. at 12.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Bethany Mclean, How Wells Fargo’s Cutthroat Corporate Culture
Allegedly Drove Bankers to Fraud, VANITY FAIR (Summer 2017),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/05/wells-fargocorporate-culture-fraud.
89 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, supra note 57 at 12.
90 Id. at 14.
91 Id.
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So, what did the Wells Fargo board know, and when did it know it?
Stumpf was aware of the problems at least as early as 2002.92 The
board established a Risk Committee in 2011, but that the committee
did not begin work until 2013. Then, following the Los Angeles Times
articles in early 2014, management began to identify and report
risky sales practices to the board and the Risk Committee.93 Yet, it
was too little, too late. In May 2015, the Los Angeles City Attorney
sued, alleging “widespread improper sales practices.”94 Scrutiny of
the bank increased. As the process of publicness began to take hold,
so did the costs to the company and the board, including the cost of
hiring outside consultants to investigate and report on the scandal
and develop proposals for change.
Nevertheless, as the 2017 Independent Report makes clear,
management information to the board was inadequate and
inaccurate.95 For example, the board was told that 230 employees
had been terminated, but those figures were not aggregated (despite
requests from the Risk Committee) and, therefore, underrepresented
the significance of the terminations.96 In addition, according to the
2017 Independent Report, management provided the board
information on enhanced monitoring that lacked detailed and
concrete plans; yet, neither the board nor the Risk Committee
insisted on revised plans.97
This board failure occurred as the scope of the scandal grew. For
example, over a period of five to seven years, to meet cross-sell
targets, employees opened millions of fake accounts, without
customer consent, including unauthorized deposit accounts and
credit card applications. 98 Initial estimates of fees to the bank were
relatively low, $2.6 million, in comparison to both the size of Wells
Fargo and the amount of fees later revealed.99 Yet, as the company
continued to release information, it became increasingly apparent
Wilfred Frost & Dawn Giel, Wells Fargo Board Slams Stumpf and
Tolstedt, CNBC (April 10, 2017),
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/10/wells-fargo-board-slamsstupf-and-tolstedt-claws-back-millions.html.
93 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, supra note 57 at 15.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 16.
97 Id. at 17.
98 Shen, supra note 55.
99 The Wells Fargo Fake Account Scandal: A Timeline, FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/pictures/ejhj45fjij/two-million-phonyaccoun/#30c2f9a76f24; Statement of Tim Sloan, Wells Fargo & Co.
Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 4 (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Sloan%20Testimo
ny%2010-3-17.pdf. (promising a refund of $6.1 million to
customers due to inappropriate fees and charges).
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that the size of the scandal was far larger than initially reported,
perhaps going back 15 years, impacting many more customers and
bringing in more fees and revenue.100 For example, in 2017, Wells
Fargo issued an additional $3.3 million in refunds and credits to
customers for improper fees and charges on top of the $2.8 million in
refunds the bank had previously issued in connection with the
scandal.101
The dollar costs of the scandal are very large. The company paid
$185 million in settlements to government agencies in 2016 and $70
million to law firms investigating the scandal.102 In the first quarter
of 2017, it spent an additional $80 million in costs related to the
situation.103 Moreover, the company initially predicted that the level
of spending would continue to increase through most of 2017,
resulting in dollar costs (to be distinguished from opportunity costs)
in the range of $425 million.104 Later predictions were even
higher.105 And, in 2018, Wells Fargo agreed to pay out $575 million
for violating consumer protection laws as a part of a settlement
covering consumers in all fifty states.106
Stumpf was not the only Wells Fargo CEO hit by the scandal. Tim
Sloan, who succeeded Stumpf, was forced to stepped down in March

Imani Moise, Wells Fargo to Pay $575 Million in Settlement with U.S.
States, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/uswells-fargo-settlement/wells-fargo-to-pay-575-million-in-settlementwith-u-s-states-idUSKCN1OR19Q; Emily Flitter, Binyamin Appelbaum
& Stacy Cowley, Federal Reserve Shackles Wells Fargo After Fraud
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/02/business/wells-fargofederal-reserve.html; Frost & Giel, supra note 92.
101 Statement of Tim Sloan, supra note 98.
102 Michael Hiltzik, That Wells Fargo accounts scandal was even worse than
you can imagine, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-01-27/wells-fargoscandal.
103 Shen, supra note 55. Apparently, the bank had projected that it
would spend 40-50 million. Id.
104 Id.
105 Tony Owusu, Wells Fargo's Legal Bill Could Exceed Current
Provisions by $2 Billion, THE STREET (May 8, 2017),
https://www.thestreet.com/story/14123498/1/estimated-cost-ofwells-fargo-account-scandal-now-stands-at-2-billion.html.
106 The settlement comes after plaintiffs suing Wells Fargo survived a
motion to dismiss in a Northern California court on October 4, 2017.
Shareholders sued the board of directors for violation of federal
securities laws and breach of fiduciary duties under Caremark. The
litigation received a lot of attention for passing the standard under
Caremark, which is notoriously difficult. See In re Wells Fargo & Co.
S’holder Derivative Litig., 282 F. Supp. 3d. 1074 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2017).
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2019.107 Sloan’s attempts to clean up the bank’s image were
unsuccessful. After his departure, Wells Fargo stated that it would
look for external candidates, a move supported by Warren Buffet,
whose company, Berkshire Hathaway, was Wells Fargo’s single
largest shareholder at the time.108 Buffett commented that although
there are good candidates from Wall Street and the financial sector,
“they are automatically going to draw the ire of a significant
percentage of the Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives, and
that’s just not smart.”109 In September 2019, Wells Fargo appointed
Charles Scharf, former Chief Executive of Bank of New York Mellon
Corp. and Visa Inc., as President and CEO.110
The company also closed over 400 branches111 and announced plans
to close 800.112 The Federal Reserve placed limits on the growth of
the company, restricting the firm from increasing its total asset size
beyond that listed as of the end of 2017. The bank was required to
make “sufficient improvements” to prevent misconduct before the
limitations would be lifted. Employees also filed lawsuits related to
the sales goals and terminations.113 Investigations abounded, with
the SEC, Department of Justice, and other government agencies
involved.114 Further, each investigation carried an imbedded risk of
uncovering new issues and further publicness, like the auto-

Rachel Louise Ensign, Wells Fargo CEO Tim Sloan Steps Down, WALL
STREET J. (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-saidceo-timothy-sloan-will-step-down-11553804261.
108 Emily Flitter, Stacy Cowley, & David Enrich, Wells Fargo C.E.O.
Timothy Sloan Abruptly Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/28/business/wells-fargotimothy-sloan.html.
109 Kimball, Warren Buffet says next Wells Fargo CEO ‘shouldn’t come
from JP Morgan or Goldman Sachs’, CNBC (Apr. 7, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/07/warren-buffet-calls-for-wellsfargo-to-look-beyond-wall-street-for-next-ceo.html.
110 Rachel Louise Ensign & Justin Baer, Wells Fargo Names Charles Scharf
CEO, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Sept. 27, 2019)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-names-charles-scharfpresident-ceo-11569583001.
111 Jen Wieczner, Here’s How Much Wells Fargo’s Fake Accounts
Scandal Is Hurting the Bank, FORTUNE (Jan. 13, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/01/13/wells-fargo-fake-accountsscandal-closing-branches-earnings/.
112 Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Plans to Close 800 More Branches by 2020,
CNN (Jan 12, 2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/12/investing/wells-fargo-shuttingbranches/index.html.
113 Id.
114 Paul Blake, Timeline of the Wells Fargo Accounts Scandal, ABC NEWS
(Nov. 3, 2016), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/timeline-wellsfargo-accounts-scandal/story?id=42231128.
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insurance fraud announced in July of 2017.115 In 2018, the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau and Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency fined Wells Fargo a total of $1 billion for the autoinsurance scandal.116 Early estimates of the out-of-pocket costs in
connection with the scandals were $2 billion but within a year those
estimates had increased to almost $3 billion.117
Fines and settlement costs, of course, do not include the opportunity
costs of failing to account for publicness such as the time of
employees, managers, and directors that could have been spent on
real growth and technological advancements.118 Time spent
responding to Congress and congressional investigations is also an
opportunity cost. As is typical in this type of situation, Congress
became part of the governance and business discussion. Senators
demanded an investigation by the Justice Department119 and
members of the House Financial Services Committee demanded
Stumpf’s presence and resignation (which came to pass).120 One
Republican member described the scandal as follows: “Fraud is
fraud. Theft is theft. And what happened at Wells Fargo over the
course of many years cannot be described any other way.”121
Jonathan Stempel, Lawsuit Says Wells Fargo Auto Insurance
Charges Were a Fraud, REUTERS (July 31, 2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-wells-fargo-insuranceidUSKBN1AG20Q.
116 Donna Borak, Wells Fargo fined $1 Billion For Insurance and
Mortgage Abuses, CNN (Apr. 20, 2018),
https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/20/news/companies/wells-fargoregulators-auto-lending-fine/index.html; See, infra notes 351-354 and
accompanying text.
117 Press Release, Attorney General Shapiro Announces $575 Million
50-State Settlement with Wells Fargo Bank for Opening Unauthorized
Accounts and Charging Consumers for Unnecessary Auto Insurance,
Mortgage Fees, Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General (Dec. 28,
2018), https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/pressreleases/attorney-general-shapiro-announces-575-million-50-statesettlement-with-wells-fargo-bank-for-opening-unauthorizedaccounts-and-charging-consumers-for-unnecessary-auto-insurancemortgage-fees/. Out-of-pocket estimates were $2 billion in 2017,
rising to almost $3 billion by 2018. Id.
118 Social license theorists measure opportunity costs in the context
of scandals and conflicts, connecting them to potential savings
related to profitability and operational cost savings in effective
social license settings. See, e.g., Daniel M. Franksa, Rachel Davis,
Anthony J. Bebbingtond, Saleem H. Alia, Deanna Kempa, & Martin
Scurrahg, Conflict Translates Environmental and Social Risk into
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119 Blake, supra note 114.
120 Id.
121 Id. (quoting Jeb Hensarling Chairman, House Financial Service
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Arbitration clauses are endemic; nevertheless, senators “slammed”
Wells Fargo for the inclusion of mandatory arbitration clauses for
customer accounts, arguing that the clauses enabled the frauds.122
Still others asked the Department of Labor to investigate whether
the company’s actions with respect to employees violated the Fair
Labor Standards Act.123 Senator Elizabeth Warren, D. Mass., called
for Stumpf to face criminal charges.124 Further, in March 2019, Tim
Sloan testified before the House Committee on Financial Services.125
Following the hearing, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
issued a statement: “We continue to be disappointed with [Wells
Fargo’s] performance under our consent orders and its inability to
execute effective corporate governance and a successful risk
management program.”126
Indeed, the “understandability” or accessibility of the account
scandal, in combination with the direct consumer impact, prompted
Senator Jon Tester, D. MT, to respond to Stumpf’s congressional
testimony with the following: “[Wells Fargo’s practices have] done
something I’ve never seen in 10 years . . . unite[] this committee —
and not in a good way.”127 Although “the public expects international
financial banks to lose billions in nefarious ways . . . learning that the
American checking account has been co-opted has insidious
wrinkles. This is supposed to be one of the most trusted things in the
world.”128
In fact, Wells Fargo risked its credibility in the community and
diminished trust in the banking system at a time when the banks
were already at a low point in terms of community support.129 The
Id.; New Protections against Mandatory Arbitration, CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (July 10, 2017),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/arbitration-rule/.
123 Blake, supra note 114.
124 Id.
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board appears to have been a victim of the Wells Fargo mythology,
built, in part by the media that tore it down. In short, the board failed
to account for the power of publicness, the risks of its incentive
system and sales tactics, and the bank’s social license. As a result, it
suffered from the process of publicness and encountered
considerable substantive publicness in the form of enforcement and
pressure for governance changes.
B. UBER.
The Uber scandals demonstrate that publicness does not occur only
in publicly held companies. Instead, Uber’s situation revealed that it,
too, was a creature of the public even before its IPO and was also
subject to substantive and process publicness when scandals
erupted. Indeed, as a result of its scandals, Uber’s CEO was ousted
and replaced, board membership and governance practices were
changed, and corporate choices were scrutinized by the government
and media. Not surprisingly, lawsuits against the company piled
up.130
Uber connects drivers to riders through an app at rates usually less
than those charged by taxi services.131 Uber pursued an IPO aiming
for a valuation of $120 billion, ultimately falling short.132 Its growth
Megan Rose Dickey, Uber Faces Another Lawsuit Due to a Lack Of
Wheelchair-Accessible Rides, TECHCRUNCH (July 18, 2017),
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was “remarkable,”133 and yet, the company still had no “sustainable
or profitable business model.”134 In fact — Uber burned through $8
billion in cash as of August 2017135 and reported a net loss of $1.2
billion in the third quarter of 2019.136
How do we know the 2017 number? It is the result of the process of
publicness. At the time some of these numbers were made public,
Uber was a private company and, therefore, was not required to
release its financials publicly. When faced with a series of scandals,
however, Uber made its financials public to argue that “its revenue
growth [was] outpacing losses . . . and the business [was] on a strong
trajectory.”137 Nevertheless, as analysts pointed out, the company
was a “cash burning machine,”138 facing a series of scandals and
controversies, which, in turn, created pressure on the governance
structure and business choices. In short, Uber was forced to
reexamine its “private” status through the process of publicness and
faced substantive publicness as well.
Let’s examine the scandals. In 2012, Uber invoked surge pricing in
the wake of Hurricane Sandy, doubling fares while public
transportation was unavailable.139 This issue is cited repeatedly as
an instance of Uber’s social insensitivity and pursuit of its own ends,
without regard to impact on the public.140 In 2013-2014, Uber was
$69 billion, “officially crowning it as the stock market debut that lost
more in dollar terms than any other American initial public offering
since 1975”).
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134 Id.
135 Eric Newcomer, Uber, Lifting Financial Veil, Says Sales Growth
Outpaces Losses, BLOOMBERG
(Apr. 14, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-0414/embattled-uber-reports-strong-sales-growth-as-lossescontinue; Tyler Durden, Uber Burned Through Almost as Much
Money as NASA Last Quarter, ZERO HEDGE (Jun. 1, 2017),
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2017-06-01/uber-burnedthrough-almost-much-money-nasa-last-quarter.
136 Shawn Knight, Uber is still burning cash at an alarming rate,
TECHSPOT (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.techspot.com/news/82635uber-burning-cash-alarming-rate.html.
137 Newcomer, supra note 135.
138 Id.
139 Shara Tibkin, Storm Surge: Uber Just Doubled Car Service Pricing
in NYC, CNET (Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.cnet.com/news/stormsurge-uber-just-doubled-car-service-pricing-in-nyc/.
140 See, e.g., Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays with Fire, N.Y. Times (Apr.
23, 2017),

24

accused of booking fake rides and spamming Lyft drivers.141 The
people canceling rides were Uber employees, including employees
paid to recruit drivers. Then, Uber attempted to keep its drivers from
working for both Uber and Lyft by falsely claiming that it was illegal
to do so.142 When the truth was publicly revealed, the company
backtracked.143
Next, an Uber executive suggested that the company hire opposition
researchers and journalists to attack the personal lives and families
of reporters who wrote “unflattering” stories about the company.144
Apparently, the executive made this comment in response to an
article by a female reporter accusing Uber of sexism and
misogyny.145 When the executive’s suggestion was made public, it
contributed to pressure on the company to step up its reaction to
sexism and other cultural deficiencies.
Then, there was the God View technology. In late 2014, it was
revealed that the God View program, which was imbedded in the
Uber app, allowed Uber to track the location of users 24/7.146 Uber
was “spying on celebrities” and the media, including Beyoncé and
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/traviskalanick-pushes-uber-and-himself-to-the-precipice.html?mcubz=1;
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reporters.147 The spying incited outrage among users. Indeed, one
entrepreneur tracked with God View described “the privacy
violation as symptomatic of Uber’s wider arrogance and dirty
business practices.”148 In 2016, after revelations from a
whistleblower, Uber entered into a settlement that required it to
remove “all personally identifiable information of riders . . . limit[]
employee access to personally identifiable information of riders, and
. . . audit[] employee access to personally identifiable information in
general.”149
In 2017, many of the problems escalated and became public.
Consider the launch of Uber’s self-driving vehicle pilot program
without permits (legal license). On the first day of the California
program, vehicles ran red lights and created hazards in bike lanes.150
The company’s response was to blame human error, but The New
York Times reported the mistakes were attributable to the selfdriving technology.151 Even though Uber was forced to remove the
cars from the road in California,152 it relaunched in Arizona with
similar issues.153
Additionally, Waymo, a unit of Google parent Alphabet, sued Uber,
accusing it and Anthony Levandowski, the engineer in charge of the
self-driving program, of trade secret theft.154 The claim was that
Levandowski stole confidential documents when he left Waymo for
Uber.155 The case settled abruptly in 2018 with Uber agreeing to
refrain from using Waymo hardware or software in Uber’s selfdriving cars. Additionally, Waymo received .34% equity in Uber as
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part of the settlement agreement.156 In January 2020, Waymo
secured a $128 million judgment against the employees who left
Waymo for Uber, 157 and a jury indicted Levandowski “on theft of
trade secret charges.”158
Uber also settled a false advertising claim for $25 million in 2017.159
Its customers claimed false advertising with respect to the customer
safety policy and fees for tolls and airport drop offs.160 The company
also paid $28.5 million to settle class actions with similar
allegations.161 Moreover, Uber faces close to $508 million in costs
following the passage of California’s Assembly Bill 5, requiring it to
classify drivers as employees, as opposed to independent
contractors.162 This bill followed another class action by 160,000
drivers claiming employee status.163 So far, the dollar value of the
settlements is relatively small but, as the process of publicness
unfolds, more cases and settlements will occur.
Indeed, Greyball, which attracted government enforcement interest,
is one such case. Uber’s legal team approved the use of Greyball, a
tool that allowed Uber to identify and evade law enforcement in the
communities in which it was operating.164 The program allowed
Uber to identify law enforcement officials who were attempting to
catch Uber’s illegal operations “in markets where its services were
not permitted” by using the application to arrange rides.165 When
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Uber thought it had identified enforcement officials hailing rides, it
would provide them with a fake ghost-car version of the app and no
driver would be dispatched.166 In doing so, it was able to evade both
enforcement and the costs of enforcement, including payments for
impounded cars and tickets issued to drivers operating illegally.167
The result was a Department of Justice investigation into Uber’s use
of Greyball.168
Next, Travis Kalanick, Uber’s CEO at the time, was caught on camera
yelling at a driver.169 Why? Because the driver asked him about
decreased fares.170 Kalanick later issued an apology and said he
would seek leadership help — noting that it was “the first time [he
was] willing to admit that [he] need[ed] leadership help.”171 This sort
of statement, unthinkable in a publicly held company, was a direct
result of the pressure that was building on Uber, and the CEO, to be
more responsive to the public. It was also a direct result of the
company’s failure to operate as if it existed with permission —
perhaps because it never sought permission in the first place;
instead, its business model involved operating outside of the
regulatory environment.172
In September 2017, the company was featured in yet another highly
publicized controversy. The city of London decided not to renew
Uber’s private hire vehicle license, and the new CEO Dara
Khosrowshahi released a public apology letter in the Evening
Standard, acknowledging that Uber needed to change its practices
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and run the business with “humility, integrity and passion.”173 This
language represents a sharp change from Kalanick’s brash, public
flaunting of regulation — and an understanding that the company’s
legal license, and not just its social license, to operate was in
jeopardy. Uber challenged the ban, was allowed to continue service,
but was subjected to regular reporting requirements.174
One of the biggest hits to Uber occurred in 2017 when Susan Fowler,
a former employee, published a blog with details of sexual
harassment and gender bias at the company.175 The blog included a
description of messages from her manager about his open
relationship and desire to find women with whom to have sex.176
According to Fowler, Uber’s Human Resources personnel responded
to her report about the situation by stating that it was the highperforming manager’s first offense, before focusing on Fowler’s
“options,” neither of which addressed the actions of her harasser.177
According to the blog, Fowler later learned human resources knew
the manager had pursued other women as well.178 This blog was the
catalyst for at least two internal investigations, eventual changes in
the board structure, and Kalanick’s resignation.179
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Fowler’s blog post prompted an investigation by the Uber board of
directors.180 The investigation involved over 200 interviews, a
review of over 3 million documents, and, in addition to the team of
lawyers, a consulting firm to assist in collecting information from a
broad group of employees.181 In short, this investigation and the
resulting report (the “Holder Report”) was not cheap.
Although Uber was a private company at the time, the process of
publicness, the desire to launch an IPO, and the need to show it was
open to change, forced it to make the Holder Report public.182 The
Holder Report contained a series of recommendations aimed at
changing the company’s culture and developing trust,
transformation, and accountability.183 These proposals include:
diminishing Kalanick’s role (the report was released prior to his
resignation), establishing criteria for the COO, developing
performance reviews to create accountability in senior leadership,
improving and empowering diversity efforts, and ensuring that
human resources operated appropriately and under the supervision
of the board.184 A well-functioning company would already have
these procedures and policies in place, but Uber did not — perhaps
in part because it was not publicly held and, therefore, not subject to
the type of ex ante, substantive publicness described in Part I of this
Article. And, perhaps because its board failed to understand the role
of social license.
Notably, the Holder Report called for enhanced board oversight, with
an independent chair, an oversight committee, an improved
compensation program, and an increase in internal controls at the
board level and beyond.185 These are the same types of substantive
publicness that Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank imposed on
publicly-traded companies as part of the publicness inherent in the
social control of and access to capital that the federal securities laws
prescribe.186 But, as a result of the process of publicness, they
Kara Swisher, Uber Has Hired HBS’s Frances Frei as a Top
Leadership and Strategy Exec to Fix Its Management Mess, VOX (June
5, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/6/5/15741982/uber-hireshbs-frances-frei-leadership-strategy-exec-fix-management-mess.
181 ERIC HOLDER, THE HOLDER REPORT ON UBER’S WORKPLACE CULTURE (June
13, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/13/technology/docu
ment-The-Holder-Report-on-Uber.html.
182 Meghann Farnsworth, Read the Full Investigation into Uber’s
Troubled Culture and Management, VOX (June 13, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/2017/6/13/15794412/read-entireinvestigation-uber-culture-management-ethics-eric-holder.
183 HOLDER, supra note 181.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 See Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing, supra note 13;
Langevoort & Thompson, “Publicness”, supra note 13.
180

30

became part of Uber’s governance — despite its “private” status at
the time.
Uber’s board was not atypical for a private, venture-backed company
where the focus was capital raising and sustaining the business long
enough to exit with a profit for the owners. But the desire of Kalanick
(and, arguably other Unicorn and tech CEOs) to maintain power and
operate outside of the public zone, resulted in a very large company
without internal controls or attention to social license. The process
of publicness forced Uber to operate more like a publicly held
company and acknowledge its failures and the need to attend to its
social license. These are all forms of substantive publicness.
In addition, following the board’s acceptance of the Holder Report
Kalanick stepped down as CEO187 — after previously saying he
would take only a leave of absence. Kalanick was not alone. Uber, like
Wells Fargo, lost a string of its executives due to its scandals.
Levandowski stepped down.188 Jeff Jones, President of Ridesharing,
resigned after only a few months in his role.189 Rachel Whetstone,
SVP of Communications and Policy, resigned.190 Brian McClendon,
the head of mapping also resigned, and so did Raffi Krikorian, one of
the self-driving leaders.191 Amit Singhal, SVP of Engineering left.192
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Ed Baker, the VP of Product and Growth left.193 And, so did Gary
Marcus, Head of Uber AI Labs;194 Sherif Marakby, VP of Global
Vehicle Programs;195 Josh Mohrer, General Manager of New York
City;196 Guatam Gupta, Head of Finance;197 Eric Alexander, Head of
Asia Business;198 Emil Michael, SVP of Business; and Sallie Yoo,
General Counsel.199
In addition, the company announced it had fired 20 employees in
response to a separate investigative report produced by the law firm
Perkins Coie on harassment issues (the “Perkins Coie Report”).200
This Report was also initiated in response to Fowler’s blog.201 The
Report stated the firm had initiated investigations into 215
harassment claims, and that although 100 claims required no action,
57 were still under review and 31 employees were being enrolled in
training or counseling.202 As with the governance issues addressed in
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the Holder Report, Uber was forced to discuss its employment
processes in an attempt to justify them to the public.203
Despite this intense scrutiny, in the midst of the Holder and Perkins
Coie Reports and discussions, a member of the board made a sexist
comment.204 The statement occurred when the only female member
of the board at the time, Arianna Huffington, noted that another
woman was joining the board.205 A male investor and board member
responded, saying there would be “more talking” on the board as a
result.206 The comment was rapidly released to the press, the process
of publicness ensued, and the board member who made the
comment, apologized and resigned.207
As these examples reveal, the publicness attendant to Uber’s
numerous scandals, resulted in the loss of the privilege of keeping its
decisions and processes “private.” Instead, the employees and then
the company made internal debates, employment matters, and
financials public. Indeed, the aforementioned blog post also detailed
wasted resources, withheld business-critical information, abandoned
projects, and “unrelenting chaos.”208 The blog even related a story
about an initial decision to buy leather jackets for all of Uber’s
engineers, but then deciding to buy them just for the men.209 The
justification? There were so few women left in the department that
the discount for women’s jackets was no longer available.210 This
story seems like a parody in light of issues being raised about the
company more broadly but was emblematic of the larger culture at
Uber.
Importantly, from a process of publicness perspective, the point is
that the leather-jacket story became public. The public learned about
the depth of the culture issues that human resources and others
were ignoring, and it also learned that employees were willing to use
Megan Rose Dickey, Inside Uber’s New Approach to Employee
Performance Reviews, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/01/inside-ubers-newapproach-to-employee-performance-reviews/.
204 Biz Carson, An Uber Board Member Made a Sexist Joke in the
Middle of the Presentation on How to Fix Uber's Sexist Culture, BUS.
INSIDER (Jun. 13, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/uberdavid-bonderman-jokes-theres-more-talking-whenwomen-join-boards-2017-6.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Heather Somerville, Uber Director David Bonderman Resigns
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2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-bondermanidUSKBN195053.
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the publicness process to expose Uber’s issues. In the words of a
column from Vox, the former employee’s blog “deftly and surgically
laid out the map that the media and others would use to prove to its
out-to-lunch board and waffling investors that Uber CEO Travis
Kalanick had to go.”211 Two venture capitalists agreed and handdelivered a letter to Travis Kalanick asking him to resign as CEO
immediately.212 The contents of that letter also became public.213
As a result of the scandals and the growing level of scrutiny of Uber,
the company was in an unrelenting process of publicness and
consequently the board’s decision-making process also became
public. Details of the CEO search process were provided to the
media.214 Names of potential CEOs were vetted not only by the
board, but also by the media.215 The fractured nature of the board
became a topic of conversation.216 Indeed, one editorial compared
the press leaks at Uber to those of the White House, concluding that
the White House press relations were tighter than Uber’s.217 These
leaks and the ensuing drama were bad for investors and for
business. They revealed insiders using outsiders (the media) to
make governance changes. In essence, insiders deployed the process
of publicness to create sufficient pressure to make the company
more accountable, transparent, and substantively public.
The process of publicness also impacted Uber’s business model. Uber
made its way into the business world with an idea and an app that
was premised on operating outside of the regulatory environment.
In order to evade legal licensing and other processes, it termed its
business “ride-sharing.” The purpose of using this term was to avoid
taxi status, and the semantic sleight of hand worked for a period of
time. The scandals and business model (“ask forgiveness, not
Kara Swisher, With Her Blog Post about Toxic Bro-Culture at
Uber, Susan Fowler Proved That One Person Can Make a Difference,
VOX (June 21, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/2017/6/21/15844852/uber-toxic-brocompany-culture-susan-fowler-blog-post.
212 Bloomberg, Read the Investor Letter That Gave Uber CEO Travis Kalanick
a Kick Toward the Door, FORTUNE (Jan. 28, 2019),
http://fortune.com/2019/01/28/uber-ceo-travis-kalanick-lawsuit-darakhosrowshahi-venture-capitalists-letter/. Kalanick stepped down from the
board effective December 31, 2019. Eliot Brown, Uber Co-Founder Travis
Kalanick Departs Board, Sells All His Shares, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 24, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-co-founder-travis-kalanick-to-departcompanys-board-11577196747.
213 Bloomberg, supra note 212.
214 Swisher, supra note 211.
215 Id.; Laurie Segall, Sara Ashley O'Brien & Kaya Yurieff, Uber Taps
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permission”) converged, and regulatory and other actions increased.
Investigations blossomed, internally, externally, and even abroad.218
The CEO was ousted and replaced, board membership and
governance practices changed, and actions were scrutinized by the
government and the media. Not surprisingly, lawsuits against the
company piled up in the wake of the scandals, and some resulted in
costly settlement agreements.219 In short, Uber is a textbook example
of how process publicness leads to substantive publicness.
In addition, Uber’s competition gained traction in the process — no
small matter, given Uber’s burn rate.220 Lyft is Uber’s biggest
competitor and, although Uber still has the largest percentage of
travelers, Lyft’s share has grown.221 Further, even though the
average Lyft ride was less expensive than the average Uber ride,222
the companies were seen as competitive on pricing and reliability.
Thus, competition was largely in the zone of “brand and
experience.”223 Lyft drivers made more money and reported being
more satisfied than Uber drivers,224 and at least one company
announced that, in light of the ethical issues at Uber, it would not
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reimburse employees who used Uber for business travel.225 Indeed,
delete-the-app boycotts grew throughout 2017.226 In cities in which
both Lyft and Uber were well-established, these boycotts were
problematic for Uber.227 In short, the scandals, failures, and chaos at
Uber, in combination with the process of publicness, increased Lyft’s
business opportunities.228
Finally, the process of publicness and its impact did not stop with
Uber. To the dismay of those in Silicon Valley, Uber’s scandal parade
resulted in calls for reform at other companies. Declaring that “Uber
was a failure of Silicon Valley’s start-up machine,” Farhad Manjoo of
The New York Times argued that Uber was just one of many
companies flouting regulations and the rule of law. In his view, Uber
suffered from a failure of oversight from investors, directors, and
partners and anyone else — in part because it was privately held and
not subject to the ex ante regulatory, substantive form of publicness.
As this case study reveals, Uber’s board lacked an understanding of
both publicness and social license. As a result, it faced an array of
enforcement actions and litigation, both of which are forms of ex post
publicness.229
III. The Theory of Social License.
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The lessons to be learned from both the Wells Fargo and Uber
scandals, as well as from their resulting publicness outcomes, are
powerful ones. Social license theory provides both a tool for
exploring these issues and a potential mechanism to help boards
engage in and think about strategy, risk management, and oversight,
spaces where the state-law based fiduciary duties have withered.
Indeed, at least part of the issue at Wells Fargo was that managers at
the Community Bank did not appreciate the potential harm because,
in part, they “failed to frame the issue appropriately.”230
Terminations were not assessed in the context of customer harm.
Instead, the focus was only on false fees or charges and not on the
associated misuse of personal information or reputational risk to the
bank.231 In short, the problems were viewed in an isolated and
transactional fashion, without attention to the long-run
consequences of the choices and risks and how those could
compound through the process of publicness. The focus was legal
license, or evading it, rather than publicness, risk management,
corporate sustainability, or relationships – the zone of social license.
The same is true of Uber and its board and officers.
Social license theory, offers a mechanism for understanding and
managing the role of accountability and publicness in corporations.
In fact, adapting the construct of social license to the corporate
governance context provides an analytical approach for boards to
use when managing publicness and risk. In that sense, it is a tool for
cost-benefit analysis that deepens the appreciation of the nature of
costs and promotes a bilateral approach to understanding a
company’s role and relationship with its communities and
stakeholders.232 Social license can also play a gap-filling role for
fiduciary duties.
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The term, “social license to operate,” is frequently used in extractive
industries.233 It is a term that is easier to define in the negative, how
a company loses it, than in the positive, how a company earns it. But,
as the use of the term and its implications have grown, so too have
models for conceptualizing social license and understanding its value
as an analytical tool.234 Indeed, the World Bank and other
international organizations discuss social license as a driver for
investment decisions, making understanding and developing social
licenses critical for entities.235 As this Part of the Article reveals,
social license is also a useful analog to publicness and to corporate
governance more generally.
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The basic concept of social license is that businesses, and other
entities, exist with permission from the communities in which they
are located, as well as with permission from the greater community
and outside stakeholders.236 As noted in the BlackRock letter and
Business Roundtable Statement, businesses are more than just
economic institutions; they are also social institutions.237 As a result,
they are subject to more than just legal oversight. They face public
accountability and, at times, public control and thus need to attend
to social license.238
In this respect, social license is related to the theories of social
capital and social contract. All three theories emphasize the power
inherent in using social resources that stem from possession of a
network of relationships of mutual acquaintances that provides each
of its members with the support of collectively owned and maintained
capital. Objective interactions in physical, economic, social, and/or
cultural spaces form this network of relationships, and interactions
between parties within the network form the basis of its power. See
Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in HANDBOOK OF THEORY AND
RESEARCH FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION 241-58 (J. Richardson ed.,
1986); Janine Nahapiet & Sumantra Ghoshal, Social Capital, Intellectual
Capital, and the Organizational Advantage, 23 THE ACADEMY OF
MANAGEMENT REVIEW 2 (Apr. 1998); James S. Coleman, Social Capital in
the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 95
(1988); Amitai Etzioni, The Responsive Community: A Communitarian
Perspective, 61 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 1 (1996).
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Of course, businesses require legal licenses, including permits,
securities registration (for public companies), and other regulatory
approvals, but these provide only a baseline. Legal licenses form a
set of permissions that allow a company to operate within legal
bounds. Social license, however, is a form of permission derived
from the community, stakeholders, and others, and it exists in the
realm beyond legal license. In this sense, it is a form of selfregulation. It derives not from legally granted permission but instead
from the development of legitimacy, credibility, and trust within the
community context. When it operates effectively, social license can
prevent demonstrations, boycotts, shutdowns, and negative
publicity, as well as the increases in regulation that are a hallmark of
publicness.239
A company’s social license is not legally constructed; it is socially
constructed. Thus, the approval and acceptance of a company and its
projects derive from its social license, for which the reach may well
exceed that of legal license. As one author states, “social license is the
judgment by communities about whether [a] company is a proper
and fitting entity that deserves to be part of [a] community. It’s a
judgment about the legitimacy of [the] company or operations.”240
Indeed, social license can “make” a business, by contributing to its
survival and success.241 Conversely, the loss of it can have dramatic
implications, including legal liability, reputational degradation, and
Shareholder Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The
Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 100, 150 (2008). Like many
forms of soft law, social license actually gains its social legitimacy
from its apolitical and public character. See, e.g., Waldron, supra
note 235.
239 Hanna, Vanclay, Langdon, & Arts, supra note 16. Front end
regulation, of course, has its costs. It can dampen the
entrepreneurial spirit. However, social license is not regulation, it
is self-regulation and long-run focused. There is evidence that
ongoing corporate concern for social license and corporate social
responsibility can aid companies embroiled in criminal
investigations, as well. For instance, corporations with strategic
corporate social responsibility programs pay, on average, 2 million
dollars less in fines during Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
enforcements. See Harrison Hong & Inessa Liskovich, Crime,
Punishment, and the Halo Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper 21215 May 2015). See
also Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang, & Luc Renneboog, Socially Responsible
Firms (Finance Working Paper No. 432/2014 August 2016) (noting
that there is a positive relationship between corporate social
responsibility efforts and firm value).
240 Hanna, supra note 233 at 18. See also Bone, supra note 15 (stating
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even the risk of violence against employees and company assets.242
Failure to consider and develop social license can result in business
failures, increased levels of regulation, and publicness in the form of
both substance and process. Thus, managing a company’s social
license is key to strategy and is valuable for risk management and
as a tool for managing publicness.243 Moreover, according to Witold
Henisz at the Wharton School of Business, it can translate into
billions of dollars.244
There are many companies and boards that currently use social
license to examine company policies and business strategies.245
Importantly, however, social license is not solely within a company’s
control, nor is it a quid pro quo. Instead, entities “earn” social license
through organizational actions that are both justified in the “eyes of
society” and not achieved through manipulation.246 Effective and
sustained social license requires moral legitimacy, and that, in turn,
is earned through consistent, trustworthy behavior, along with
solutions and compromises achieved through dialogue with relevant
sectors of the community.247 The dialogue is key: effective social
license is bilateral and not the result of public relations and
marketing alone.
A. The Stages of Social License.
Although scholars have explored the concept of social license
through multiple lenses, they tend to emphasize three key stages:
legitimacy, credibility, and trust.248 These stages correspond to the
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benefits of social license: acceptance, approval, and identity. Entities
must earn and maintain their social licenses. Failure to do so, as the
case studies discussed in this section reveal, can result in significant
costs and business losses.
1. Legitimacy.
The first stage, legitimacy, is the easiest to achieve and thus forms
the baseline of social license. Below legitimacy, social license is
absent or “withdrawn.” Legitimacy leads to the social acceptance of
the entity.249 It exists when the community and stakeholders give the
company the benefit of the doubt, believing that the company is
committed to working with the community and that concerns will be
addressed. The legitimacy level of social license thus is often tacit,
though not necessarily silent.250 It requires a widespread perception
of fairness and can be achieved through consistency and good
procedures.251 Legitimacy may also require fair distributions of
benefits.252
Interestingly, once achieved, legitimacy tends to be “resilient to
particular events.”253 If a company departs from accepted norms, it
will risk its legitimacy; yet, as long as the history between the
company and the stakeholders is stable, a single event is unlikely to
be disruptive. Instead, stakeholders are likely to view the particular
event as “unique.”254 Significant scandals and sustained, repeated
questionable activities, however, can undermine legitimacy.255
Consider the example of BP and the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline in Georgia. The multi-year process of developing a social
license for this project took commitment by BP and was required by
lenders. At the time, the pipeline was the “largest cross-border
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infrastructure construction project in the world.”256 Scholars
evaluating it concluded the project had both economic and sociopolitical legitimacy. They also noted that BP’s strategy documents
spoke directly of social license as important to its business.257
Recall that, in effect, legitimacy “boils down to fairness” both in
terms of process and benefits.258 To develop legitimacy, BP
worked with the community in advance of choosing a location for the
pipeline.259 The company commissioned a regional review, which the
International Finance Corporation, one of the lenders on the project,
described as “ground breaking.”260 This review addressed a
multitude of issues, including “human rights, revenue management,
and security.”261 In addition, BP engaged in an “extensive public
consultation and disclosure program” and committed to a $25
million community investment program, a program to build NGO
capacity, a program for environmental investment, and a program to
develop links with small and medium enterprises.262
For BP to achieve legitimacy, it had to build an understanding of the
communities’ cultures and then tailor its relationship and programs
to those cultures.263 The regional review was a significant
contributor to earning legitimacy.264 The review also provided BP
with considerable information about various stakeholder groups and
allowed it to provide more moderate proposals, built through
consensus, which in some cases, were less extensive than initial
proposals by other groups.265 In short, the review helped BP assess
the best route for the pipeline, determine further actions critical to
engaging with the citizens and groups to be impacted, and negotiate
for different, and in some cases, less expensive outcomes.266
BP followed through on specific obligations related to labor supply
and community investment.267 Sharing the economic benefits of the
project was central to the fairness perception legitimacy requires.268
For example, BP committed its contractors and subcontractors to
International Finance Corporation, The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
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hiring local workers, which was important to the citizens and helped
the company avoid the types of unrest and tension that can arise
with outside workers.269 BP also spent $30 million on programs that
enriched communities, including programs for energy efficiency and
school and civic buildings.270 Additionally, people received relocation
compensation and reported being generally satisfied with the
compensation and the process.271
With pressure and requirements from lenders, BP worked to earn a
social license. It compiled considerable information about what was
important and necessary to local communities and then followed
through with funding and policies to establish its legitimacy. The
scholars who reviewed the project several years after its
completion concluded that as a result of the consultation process
and follow through, “there were some concerns about compensation
and other issues, [but] there was no fundamental opposition to the
idea of the pipelines.”272
To be sure, neither the project nor the company is without
controversy. Indeed, the pipeline and the process were scrutinized
and criticized by various groups.273 The sheer size of the pipeline,
combined with the tragedy of the Deepwater Horizon deaths and oil
spill,274 ensure that human rights and other groups will continue to
scrutinize and criticize the company.275 That ongoing scrutiny is,
however, part of social license. That is, social license is not a one and
done phenomenon. Instead, as the next study makes clear, social
license is bilateral and not just about “public relations” and attention.
2. Credibility.
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The second level of social license is “credibility.” Credibility requires
the prior existence of legitimacy.276 Here, however, the focus is on
the company working with stakeholders to achieve more than just
tacit approval. Instead, the company builds a relationship that
involves initial trust and stakeholder voice in operations.277
Credibility, like legitimacy, requires action and interaction above the
legally required line.278 For credibility to exist, the entity and the
project must be “believable,” and the entity’s promises must be both
realistic and achievable.279 Put differently, before an entity can earn
credibility, the stakeholders must perceive it to be honest.280
In addition to honest and open communication, credibility requires
deliverables.281 The company must have certain characteristics and
the community must believe it has them.282 Those key qualities
include a “high level of technical competence, a high level of skills,
and a commitment to social performance.”283 The latter requires
assessment of potential social and environmental issues in advance
of the project, mitigation and monitoring programs throughout the
project, and ongoing social programs and compliance
commitments.284
Entities that lack credibility face an array of problems and business
threats. For example, they may face boycotts and other
manifestations of social pushback.285 When an entity establishes
credibility, however, it moves beyond the legitimacy/acceptance line
and into stakeholder approval.286
San Cristobal, a large mine located in two communities in Bolivia,
provides an example of the evolution (and devolution) of credibility.
Boutilier & Thomson, supra note 17; Demuijnck & Fasterling,
supra note 17; Kathleen M. Wilburn & Ralph Wilburn, Achieving
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Initially, a fully-owned subsidiary of the Sumitomo Corporation
operated the mine.287 When the company moved into the area, it
worked to establish legal and social licenses, gaining both rights to
the minerals and permission from the community to start work.288 It
developed legitimacy by communicating and providing local
employment.289
After a few years of developing information about the land and
minerals, it became apparent that the minerals were extensive, and
the company wanted to expand its operations.290 At this point, it
increased discussions with the community and reached an
agreement to relocate people away from the mining sites.291 The
company empowered the community to manage many aspects of the
relocation, including selecting the new location and designing houses
and infrastructure.292 Community members began to feel like coowners and partners in the project — a key component of
credibility.293
Shortly after people relocated, however, women, who were not
included in the decision-making process, expressed dissatisfaction
with the housing.294 In addition, for various reasons, including falling
metal prices, the company’s assessment of the project changed, and
it laid off employees.295 According to scholars who later assessed the
project, the company lost its credibility with the community.
Community members no longer believed in the processes developed
with the company. Why? Because the company backed away from
commitments and, thereby, disrupted the credibility it had built.
The company did not want to close the mine altogether, but it
needed to stabilize its relationship with the community.296 To do so,
the company initiated an employment program that extended
beyond the mine into tourism and agriculture, providing the
community with varied and stable employment opportunities not
dependent only on mining activity.297 It also engaged in other
sustained actions to improve the community, and, according to the
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scholars evaluating the project, stakeholders again began to see the
company as credible.298
A change in mine ownership, however, disrupted the developing
social license. The new management lacked knowledge of the history
or commitments between the prior company and the
communities.299 Top management at the new company stopped
meeting with community members.300 Then, commitments on
employment and training fell through, and the community stopped
believing in its relationship with the company. Importantly, this loss
of credibility occurred even though the community had almost full
employment, and later the company again had to invest years in
rebuilding that credibility.301
What happened? The company set out to develop a relationship, but
at various points it lost interest and focus. It failed to follow through
on its commitments, which is crucial to the believability standard.
Eventually, the company’s erratic approach threatened the existence
and profitability of the mine, and it worked to resolve the issues and
reestablish its social license.302 To do so, it reiterated its
commitments and established a community-based program to assess
and comply with all of the company’s prior commitments.303 Over
time as the projects came to fruition, the community again began to
view the company as credible;304 yet, a better understanding of social
license and its bilateral nature could have resulted in fewer
disruptions and earlier and sustained traction for the business
within the community.
3. Trust.
The final level of social license is trust, a stronger, more durable form
of credibility.305 Like credibility, trust is cumulative and requires an
entity to have achieved both legitimacy and credibility.306 At the trust
stage, the entity moves from acceptance and approval to a state
where the stakeholders identify with the entity.307 Here, the
stakeholders have confidence that the company’s decisions will be at
least neutral, if not always in the community’s best interests.308 This
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stage can be described as akin to psychological identification, in
which the interests of the company and the community are
aligned.309
At the trust stage, stakeholders may see their future as tied to that of
the entity, and even feel responsibility for the accompanying benefits
and burdens.310 As a result, trust can carry risks. A community that
closely identifies with or comes to depend on an entity is at risk if
the company decides to withdraw.311 The entity is also at risk.
Boycotts, demonstrations, or even violence on the part of
community stakeholders can result when trust is violated.312 Thus,
arguably, trust may be the component of social license that has less
traction — at least for some companies.
Nevertheless, trust can produce real, tangible benefits for a company
that achieves it. Take, for example, Gap, Inc., an international retailer
that faced human rights issues arising out of labor issues in its
supply chain.313 After experiencing considerable pressure over
human rights issues including child and bonded labor Gap worked to
build relationships with its stakeholders.314 It developed a set of
principles documented in a Social Responsibility Report.315 This
report was notable at the time because it admitted to prior issues,
providing some transparency, and also stated an ongoing
commitment to improving factory conditions.316
Gap continues to produce this report and has engaged NGOs and
others in its monitoring efforts, thus increasing its believability
among such groups.317 In addition, the company committed itself to
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“forging sustainable solutions” and “creating lasting change.”318 The
principles it developed to achieve those goals are the type any
company, or board, might consider, including: inspecting,
monitoring, and measuring; integrating compliance into business
practices; collaborating with external stakeholders to address the
systemic and cultural issues contributing to the human rights
challenges; and communicating transparently with stakeholders.319
The establishment of, and adherence to, these principles was
significant, in part because many of the factors contributing to the
human rights problems were outside of its control.320 The principles
and adherence to them was part of building credibility. Once Gap
established its credibility and commitment to long-term resolution
of the issues, it even earned trust among stakeholders who had
recently boycotted the company.321 Interestingly, several years later,
when information surfaced that a supplier in India was using bonded
labor, that trust played a key role.322 Stakeholders who had
previously opposed and boycotted Gap rose to its defense.323 Their
defense of the company revealed trust in action and a strong level of
identification between Gap and its stakeholders.324 Through
sustained, credible actions, Gap had earned belief and trust in its
commitment to preventing human rights violations.
It is important to note, however, that not all company/stakeholder
relationships require the full legitimacy-credibility-trust process of
social license.325 Depending on the nature of the industry and its
expected longevity in the community, some companies may
cooperate effectively with stakeholders by developing only
legitimacy.326 Indeed, for low-commitment, fluid transactions,
legitimacy may be all that is necessary.327 Then, as social capital in
environmental, and political pressures. See also Blair, Williams, &
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the relationship and the company’s stake in the project grows,
credibility and trust may become more important to the company
and the overall success of the project.328
All three of these case studies exhibit social license in operation.
They reveal how a board might deploy social license theory in its
business strategy and risk management. Of course, this theory, like
many others, is not a panacea. Nevertheless, the case studies
explored here underscore how companies worked to achieve social
license because it was both profitable and powerful.329 The case
studies also reveal that social license is not just about public
relations campaigns, which are one-sided in nature. Rather, enacting
the social license theory requires sustained engagement with
multiple parties, believable and fulfilled commitments, strong
transparency, ongoing communication, and relationship building.
IV. Wells Fargo, Uber, and Social License.
As the case studies in Part III reveal, the social license framework —
legitimacy, credibility, and trust, along with their corollaries of
acceptance, approval, and identity — is a powerful tool for an
organization engaging in the type of forward thinking suggested by
Fink in his letters to CEOs.330 This realm, of course, is the space in
which boards perform some of their most important functions. Yet,
as the Wells Fargo and Uber case studies detail, the process of
publicness can engulf the board, preventing it from focusing on the
long-run goals and strategy of the company and forcing it into
continual reaction mode.331 This section of the Article examines the
scandals at Wells Fargo and Uber through the lens of social license
theory, developing it as a framework for boards to engage with and
use to oversee management. Used in this manner, social license can
help boards fulfill their long-term strategy and risk-management
roles, and even their fiduciary duties, while tempering both the
substance and process of publicness.
A. Wells Fargo’s Social License.
Let’s begin with Wells Fargo. Its former CEO, Tim Sloan, stated that,
to regain lost trust, the bank “must continue to be transparent with
all . . . stakeholders and go beyond what has been asked . . . by
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regulators.”332 This statement is at odds with the bank’s prior vision
of itself as a trusted community bank. Wells Fargo saw itself as a
localized and connected bank. To succeed, of course, Wells Fargo, like
all banks, needed to persuade people to give it their money. That, in
itself, requires legitimacy, credibility, and trust — the fundamental
components of a social license. Yet, after the initial account scandals
were revealed, Wells Fargo was forced to close 400 branch banks
and had trouble persuading customers to maintain accounts.333 This
situation recalls the 1929 run on the banks — a situation resulting
from panic and fear — and an accompanying loss of legitimacy,
credibility, and trust in the system. Although there is reason to
believe the Wells Fargo scandal may not be repeated at other
banks,334 it nevertheless goes to the heart of the prerequisites for a
strong financial system: trust between customers and their banks.335
How did Wells Fargo lose its social license? Recall that it came out of
the 2008-2009 financial crisis with its reputation intact and,
seemingly, the strongest business of any of the banks.336 It appeared
to be unsullied by the issues plaguing its peers.337 Nevertheless, as it
pressed the cross-sell strategy, it fell victim to its own mythology,
failing to consider the consequences of the strategy or to create
systems to manage the risks of its business decisions.
From 2010-2015, Wells Fargo’s assets grew by 46% and its net
income grew by over 85%.338 Its stock price also increased, making it
Stacey Cowley, Wells Fargo May Have Found More Fake Accounts
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the most valuable bank in the world. Community Banking
contributed more to that growth than any other division at the bank,
but the Community Bank’s performance was directly connected to
the cross-selling fraud.339 Indeed, analysts made buy
recommendations based on the cross-selling growth. In fact, the
cross-sell ratio at Wells Fargo (6.27) was more than twice the
average for U.S. banks (2.71) — a discrepancy that should have
provoked dialogue and inspection both in the boardroom and by
analysts.340 This information was public and available to the board,
but the board failed to ask questions about what accounted for the
bank’s unmatched success.341 Those deliberations might well have
created an opportunity to investigate the legitimacy of the success,
the credibility of management’s responses, the downside risks, and
the potential for measuring and managing those risks.342
Moreover, those discussions might well have revealed that the crosssells transpired in a world of incentives and coercion. There were
quarterly bonuses for junior employees and annual bonuses for
district managers.343 There were also quotas, which employees say
were unrealistic and, when combined with comments from
managers, resulted in pressure to open the fake accounts, including
at least one for a homeless woman with fees of $39 per month.344
This example is salient in the context of legitimacy: it is impossible to
give the benefit-of-the-doubt to a bank whose employees engage in
this sort of fraud.
The actual number of unauthorized accounts is unknown. The
company admitted to 2.1 million such accounts in 2016, but in July of
2017, it expanded its investigation to include earlier years and
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estimates increased to 3.5 million.345 Despite indications that the
practices went back to 2002,346 the bank, investigated only the years
2009-2016.347 Tim Sloan resisted pressure to look for earlier
violations.348 This choice, and the media churn around it, made clear
that neither Sloan, nor apparently the board, had a handle on the
depth of the company’s problems. Indeed, the ongoing account
scandal and lack of a credible response steadily diminished
credibility and led to Tim Sloan’s eventual resignation.349
Overtime, the process of publicness exposed additional frauds.350
Take for example, the car loan-repossession scandal. Between
20,000 and 570,000351 customers of the bank were enrolled in and
charged for car insurance without their knowledge, and when some
of them failed to make payments on the unknown insurance, they
had their cars repossessed.352 Even though Wells Fargo said it was
“extremely sorry” and promised to refund customers and work with
credit bureaus, its response lacked credibility.353 Credibility requires
believability, but as each new scandal forced the bank to deploy a
new investigation and publicly admit to new problems, its credibility
diminished.
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In fact, the problems at Wells Fargo that contributed to the loss of its
social license seem to have been endemic. As the New York City
Comptroller Scott Stringer said in response to the auto-loan
revelations, “This is a full-blown scandal — again. It's unbelievable,
outrageous, sad, and yet quintessential Wells Fargo.”354 This
comment points to the culture of the bank at the root of its issues. It
also underscores the ongoing devolution of its social license, a
problem with which the board continues to contend. The process of
publicness contributed to the bank losing its social license, but Wells
Fargo also lost its social license because its rhetoric, ethics, and sales
policies did not correlate with its incentives. Sales manuals required
signatures and consent for all “solutions” or services, but incentives
and pressure produced the opposite. The picture simply did not
match the soundtrack.
Indeed, employees who pushed back suffered retaliation, including
harassment and firings.355 Consider this headline: I Called the Wells
Fargo Ethics Line and Was Fired.356 Evidence of employees raising
issues through established bank procedures and then being
terminated exists for many years before the scandal became
public.357 No wonder employee stakeholders did not trust the bank.
Yet, the scandals point to something even more troubling: a company
culture focused on growth at the expense of its customers, its
employees, and the stability of the banking system. In short, the
series of scandals “undermines confidence, which is the most
important asset of [the] bank.”358
Recall that the perception of fairness is central to establishing
legitimacy. According to the academics who studied the Georgia
project, BP worked to build legitimacy by expending resources
engaging with and investing in the communities where it wanted “to
do business.” It hired local workers and engaged stakeholders. In
contrast, Wells Fargo undermined its legitimacy by treating its
workers unfairly. Indeed, when the accounts scandal began to
surface, the bank used its employees as scapegoats, blaming and
firing them rather than owning up to and taking responsibility for
the sales culture the leadership created.
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Wells Fargo, like Sumitomo in the San Cristobal mine situation, also
lacked a coherent and consistent set of actions to build its credibility.
The leadership involved in the San Cristobal mine went through
several changes, and the company’s interest in the mine varied over
time. The company’s failure to follow through on commitments lead
to disbelief in its statements and promises. Then, when mineral
prices increased, the company lacked the support it needed and was
forced to increase its local expenditures in order to rebuild its social
license and, thereby, its business.
Although Wells Fargo was not planning to go out of business or even
put growth on hold, it faced a situation similar to the one Sumitomo
faced. The unrelenting process of publicness and the years of
inattention by the board and management resulted in a bank unable
to regain its footing. Here is where engaging in and thinking about
social license might have aided the board. Boards pay attention to
company financials and hear regular reports about growth and
challenges.359 As noted above, most of Wells Fargo’s growth was
coming from the Community Bank. The account fraud was key to the
bank’s strategy, with cross-sell numbers significantly above those of
other banks — yet no one pressure tested the strategy. Ironically, the
premise of the cross-sell was to make customers sticky, a long-run
strategy requiring the legitimacy and credibility undercut by the
fraud.
The role of the board is to oversee strategy development and set
pillars against which management can execute. To execute, the board
must ask questions and question answers, providing effective
challenges and ensuring oversight. The questions appear to have
been missing here.360 A focus on legitimacy, credibility, and trust,
with discussions about what was underpinning the remarkable 18year growth in cross-sales, might have led to discovery of the faulty
execution of the strategy. In short, situations where the numbers are
“too good to be true” are the type of situations on which boards,
fulfilling their fiduciary duties, watching out for sustained and
systemic problems, and acting with social license in mind, should
focus.361
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The bank also squandered the trust it appeared to have achieved
after successfully navigating the financial crisis. Recall the Gap case
study from Part III. Gap built trust by admitting its complicity in
human rights and labor violations, stating an ongoing commitment
to reforming its labor practices, and then following through by
increasing transparency and monitoring. Initially, it seemed that
Wells Fargo might adopt this example by issuing a report of its own
and outlining its failures in managing the cross-sell approach. Yet, a
slew of scandals continued to come to light after the issuance of that
report. Moreover, the bank’s reluctance to investigate reports of pre2008 cross-selling reveal that it was focused on accepting
responsibility only for scandals that had already been publicly
revealed — and not on executing a more comprehensive approach to
reform and compliance.
Here is where attention to social license would have been beneficial.
If the Wells Fargo board had been operationalizing social license
from the beginning, initial questions would have focused on
legitimacy. Post-financial crisis, all banks were subject to scrutiny
and were targets for the media and the process of publicness.
Indeed, it is fair to say that the industry as a whole was not in the
zone of “benefit of the doubt.” Management reports on strategy
execution should have been followed by questions about potential
pitfalls and challenges, and how those, in turn, might impact an
already shaky position of legitimacy among stakeholders.362
Similarly, the board should have inquired about the incentive effects
imbedded in strategy execution choices. These are the exact
questions that, when executing on its oversight responsibility (and
fulfilling its fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith),363 a board
should pursue. Indeed, the oversight role requires the board to posit
whether incentives might lead to unethical and illegal behavior.
Incentives gone wrong can have a dramatic impact on credibility.
Indeed, when employees are creating fake accounts for customers or
adding unauthorized auto insurance to car loans, the bank is risking
its legitimacy, credibility, and trust.
Engagement of this sort would have enabled the board to monitor
the company’s strategy execution and to fulfill its risk management
A discussion of this sort might also have revealed that the Wells,
community-based strategy had a shelf life in the era of mobile
banking. It is now clear that other banks began closing their
branches far earlier than Wells, but the unrelenting focus on crosssells, propped up by fake accounts, appears to have prevented the
board (and perhaps management) from focusing on the next era in
banking. Egan, supra note 334.
363 See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del 2006) (describing the
fiduciary duty of good faith as a subset of the duty of loyalty).
362
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role. Boards engage in risk management in multiple ways. For
example, audit committees receive reports from whistleblower
hotlines on a regular basis, including reports of allegations like those
at Wells Fargo or, for example, safety violations at manufacturing
companies. Boards also receive reports tracking changes in levels of
internal and external complaints, as well as risky investments.
Human resources may provide updates about terminations or
significant personnel issues. This sort of information is key to risk
management and in the zone of board oversight. Moreover, as this
Article makes clear, the failure to attend to it results in publicness
and the loss of social license.
Although it is unclear what information the Wells Fargo board
received, ex post investigations reveal that the company’s
decentralized nature and, perhaps management evasion resulted in
fragmented reporting, which, in turn contributed to the sustained
nature of the fraud. Yet, if the board had pressed with questions
about management strategy and its downside risks, the board would
have ensured dialogue about the types of underlying facts necessary
to develop legitimacy, credibility, and trust and thus helped to
protect the company’s social license.364 That type of engagement is
consistent both with the board’s fiduciary duties of loyalty and good
faith and with its role in ensuring that management is on track with
respect to understanding and vetting risks to the company.365
B. Uber’s Social License.
Uber also struggled to maintain social license. Early on, it appeared
to have met the sort of low level, benefit-of-the-doubt standard
required for legitimacy. It provided rides for less than taxis — and
with greater reliability. It found a niche in a market that was
perceived as overpriced. Demand for transportation of this sort was
significant, and Uber capitalized on it. Moreover, the center of its
business — the app — worked. Drivers showed up as promised and
most rides were uneventful, which helped Uber move from

In this sense, a focus on social license correlates with the
information-forcing-substance theory that I and others have
developed for the role that the federal securities laws play in the
fiduciary duty space. See, e.g., Sale & Langevoort, supra note 37;
Sale, J.P. Morgan, supra note 13; Sale & Thompson, supra note 13;
Sale, supra note 360.
365 See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (developing board’s risk oversight role); Stone, 911 A.2d
at 362; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006); Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). See
also Sale, supra note 364; Sale & Langevoort, supra note 37; Heidi
Mandanis Schooner, Big Bank Boards: The Case for Heightened
Administrated Enforcement, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1011, 1016-18 (2017).
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legitimacy to credibility among its customer base. Indeed, that is
how it won supporters and attracted repeated rounds of funding.
Yet, Uber’s business model was premised on not applying for legal
licenses. It treated government regulators as “an impediment, not an
entity to partner with or seek approval from.”366 Termed “regulatory
entrepreneurship,”367 Uber’s rhetoric focused on its aspirations to
change laws and regulations. Its behavior, however, seems to have
gone well beyond simply eluding regulation through “ride-sharing”
to building a business model premised on law breaking and
lawlessness.
Name the stakeholder, and Uber appears to have had an argument
with it. Its insistence on law breaking resulted in billables for its
lawyers and also engendered a series of “high-profile spats and
setbacks.”368 The company had a succession of disputes with city
governments, taxi drivers, and its own workers.”369 It built software
systems to evade law enforcement and to lobby regulators and
legislatures, creating an approach of evasion and protection.370 Uber
also took advantage of the fact that the regulatory environment was
largely local in nature, allowing for a divide and conquer approach
— that, as one city after another caved under the pressure, made
Uber’s lawbreaking seem normal and even positive.371
These issues and the corporate culture became transparent only in
the wake of a series of scandals exposed through the process of
publicness, thus allowing Uber to push forward until halted by
publicness. Two key stakeholders, investors and riders, were
“sticking with” Uber, and those stakeholders were the ones that
provided the money. Yet, as discussed in Part II, Uber eventually lost
some of both. Without investors and riders, Uber would have
nothing — no business license and no social license. Dara
Khosrowshahi seems to have understood this issue embarking upon
a “global apology tour” in an effort to clean up the image with the
public and enable it to go public.372
Lev-Ram, supra note 221.
See, e.g. Pollman & Barry, supra note 172. This is a term that puts
a very generous gloss on what was, in effect, operating outside the
rule of law.
368 Lev-Ram, supra note 221.
369 David Morris, Uber Responds to Rage over Alleged
‘Strikebreaking’ During Immigration Protests, FORTUNE (Jan. 29,
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/29/uber-immigrationprotests/.
370 See supra notes 165-168 and accompanying text.
371 See, e.g., Pollman & Barry, supra note 172.
372 Kate Conger & Mike Isaac, Two Top Uber Executives Are Out as C.E.O.
Consolidates Power, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/technology/uber-chief-operatingmarketing-officer.html.
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Uber’s loss of its social license did not occur for want of opportunity
to develop it. Uber could have built strong legitimacy by employing
local workers and investing in the communities where it was
developing its service. In contrast to BP, which opened dialogue,
worked to treat local workers fairly, and invested in the
communities,373 Uber mistreated its workers and disregarded
community regulations and norms. Uber lied to employees by telling
them they could not legally work both for Lyft and Uber;374 its
former CEO verbally abused a driver (at least once);375 it operated
without legal license;376 it disregarded and displaced local taxi
drivers;377 and it charged surge prices during crises and disasters.378
In short, Uber chose to reject the power of legitimacy.
It similarly failed to take advantage of opportunities to build
credibility or trust; instead, it met community concerns with
hostility and displayed an inability to reform its corporate culture of
aggression, harassment, and exploitation. Recall how Sumitomo
worked to rebuild its credibility by ensuring it followed through on
its commitments to the community. Uber, in contrast, committed to
addressing the pervasive culture of sexual harassment within the
company, and then continued to engage in conduct that exacerbated,
rather than ameliorated, the problem. Trust requires that
stakeholders have confidence that actions will be, at minimum,
neutral. The process of publicness, however, revealed that Uber was
unconcerned with stakeholder relationships and the believability of
its statements.
The series of scandals eroded its social license in other ways as well.
Lyft attracted a larger share of the market and signed contracts with
Waymo and General Motors.379 The unrelenting negative process of
publicness took a toll. From delete-the-app boycotts to companies
choosing not to reimburse employees for Uber rides, Uber’s business
was under challenge — primarily because the company lost the trust
of its stakeholders. Its investors knew this and were concerned, in
part because Uber was overvalued, not profitable, and had a very
high burn rate,380 requiring new and repeated capital infusions to
keep it afloat.381
See, supra notes 258-272 and accompanying text.
See, supra notes 142-143 and accompanying text.
375 See, supra notes 169-171 and accompanying text.
376 See, supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text.
377 See, supra notes 369 and accompanying text.
378 See, supra note 139 and accompanying text.
379 See, supra note 221 and accompanying text.
380 See, supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
381 Blair Hanley Frank, Uber Investors Reportedly Push CEO Travis
Kalanick out of Company, VENTUREBEAT (June 20, 2017),
https://venturebeat.com/2017/06/20/uber-investors-reportedlypush-ceo-travis-kalanick-out-of-company/.
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Like Sumitomo in the San Cristobal mine case, Uber needed to
reassure not just its investors, but also its stakeholders. The board’s
actions conveyed that it was aware of this need. It took steps to
stabilize the company and rebuild trust with its stakeholders:
venture capitalists left the board and were replaced by independent
directors; board members elevated the status of the board with
respect to management; Kalanick resigned;382 personnel policies
were revised;383 and the board appointed a new CEO.384 All of these
were steps to save the company and prevent its market share from
continuing to slip. They were also steps designed to reestablish
aspects of the company’s social license by treating publicness as part
of the cost-benefit analysis.
Like Gap, Uber increased its transparency. It released information to
the public even when not legally required, revealing an
understanding that attention to legitimacy through transparency
was key to its recovery and to sustaining relationships. The board
expected management to build internal processes ensuring the
company’s strategy did not negatively impact efforts to rebuild the
company’s social license. The Holder Report was not binding in a
legal sense, but what Uber learned the hard way is that the report
was tied to legitimacy, credibility, and trust. Credibility requires
transparency, consistency, and honesty. The board must model those
traits. The business model and level of deterioration and distraction
inside the company exacerbated the process.385 Reestablishing social
license requires implementing compliance, oversight, and riskmanagement systems that result in transparent, legitimate, and
credible behaviors — not the norm for Uber before its crises. Paying
attention to those issues, however, was key to rebuilding the
company and allowing it to go public. It was also a powerful way to
manage both the substance and process of publicness.386
Kalanick has not gone quietly, but the board has pushed back.
Johana Bhuiyan, Uber Board Member and Co-Founder Garrett Camp
Says Travis Kalanick Is Not Coming Back as CEO, VOX (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/2017/8/7/16108778/garrett-camp-ubertravis-kalanick-ceo.
383 Kara Swisher, Here’s one of Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi’s new rules of
the road: ‘We do the right thing. Period,’ RECODE (Nov. 7, 2017),
https://www.vox.com/2017/11/7/16617340/read-uber-darakhosrowshahi-new-rule-values-meeting.
384 Id.
385 Benjamin Edelman, Uber Can’t Be Fixed — It’s Time for
Regulators to Shut It Down, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 21, 2017),
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Conclusion.
The BlackRock letter and the Business Roundtable Statement make
clear that long-term corporate success requires boards to pursue
governance models that anticipate and respond to stakeholder
concerns. This Article posits that social license theory is a powerful
tool for boards to employ to manage those concerns. To this end, the
Article develops social license theory in the context of both
publicness and the board of directors’ role in overseeing strategy
and risk management. Social license theory adds to the discussions
in the literature about reputational capital, among other theories,
and provides an additional tool for corporate governance scholars to
leverage in analyzing governance gaps and publicness. At its core
social license incorporates concepts of sustainability and
relationship building; it is about value creation, long term focus, and
sustained and systematic operations and governance. As the
examples in Part III reveal, companies from mining, oil, and textile
industries have used social license to build and maintain their
businesses and company reputations — underscoring the power of
the theory in action.
When deployed by the board, social license may also empower
compliance and other risk management personnel.387 What we know
from the research is that systematic inspections and programs are
likely more effective than programs based on incentives and
penalties, because the latter tend to undermine individual
motivations to comply.388 In addition, self-regulatory structures
perform well only when third-party monitoring exists.389 Thus,
having a board that is engaged in and thinking about the company’s
legitimacy, credibility, and trust will support compliance and risk
management more generally and, thereby, help to ensure strategy
execution and fulfillment of the board’s fiduciary duties.
In sum, as the Wells Fargo and Uber case studies reveal, social
license theory can be conceptualized as a tool for boards and a
protected by the business judgment rule. Sale & Langevoort, supra
note 37. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (“[I]t
should be noted that the business judgment rule operates only in the
context of director action. Technically speaking, it has no role where
directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious
decision, failed to act.”).
387 Jodi L. Short & Michael W. Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More
than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 370 (2010).
388 Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(2000); Short & Toffel, supra note 387 at 371.
389 Short & Toffel, supra note 387 at 371; Blair, Williams, & Lin,
supra note 17.
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framework for engaging in the fiduciary duties of good faith and
loyalty. Strategy execution is not risk free, and the failure to project
and consider risks is a board failure. Of course, risks and profits are
correlated, but so are risks and publicness. The role of directors is to
hold management accountable for engaging in actual risk
management and to ensure that systems are in place to catch and
manage risks. Thus, whether the problems are fraud, as at Wells
Fargo, or law breaking, as at Uber, the board’s role is to develop
sustained and systematic risk management programs and to be
sufficiently engaged in monitoring corporate decision-making to
ensure the execution of strategy with an understanding of the
stakeholder concerns that publicness makes apparent. Here is where
social license theory has traction — it provides boards with a
framework for executing fiduciary duties, engaging in forward
thinking cost-benefit analyses, weighing choices for legitimacy,
credibility, and trust, and developing systems to build transparency
and accountability. As a result, social license can help to protect
companies from the process of publicness and thereby avoid the
inevitable outcome of that process — additional substantive
publicness.
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